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PROBLEM, BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE 
A major objective of antitrust policy is that of influencing 
market performance.l In industries where a high degree of competition 
is feasible, a policy which inc.reases competition may be expected to 
lead to greater efficiency, thereby improving performance. An interest-
ing feature of American antitrust policy is that while it is undoubtedly 
intended to influence performance, the antitrust statutes tend to be 
highly conduct oriented. One difficulty inherent in this approach is 
that market conduct is not always easy to ascertain. As a consequence, 
lrhroughout this study, references to the terms market structure, 
market performance, and market conduct will be as defined by Joe Bain, 
Industrial Organization, (New York, 1959), pp. 7-9. "Market structure 
refers ... to the organizational characteristics of the market .. 
. . [Especially] those characteristics which determine the relations of 
sellers in the market to each other, of the sellers to the buyers, and 
of sellers established in the market to other actual or potential 
suppliers of goods, including potential new firms which might enter the 
market. In other words, market structure for practical purposes means 
those characteristics of the organization of a market which seem to 
influence strategically the nature of competition and pricing within 
the market. 11 
Market conduct "refers to the patterns of behavior which 
enterprises follow in adapting or adjusting to the markets in which 
they sell (or buy). 11 
Market performance "refers to the composite of end results in the 
dimensions of price, output, production costs, selling costs, product 
design, and so forth, which enterprises arrive at in any market as the 
consequence of pursuing whatever lines of conduct they espouse. 11 
l 
if firms in an industry are suspected of having deviated from the 
competitive norm, it may be necessary for the courts to attempt to 
infer conduct from observed market structure and performance. An 
obvious danger is that the courts might make an inaccurate inference. 
In order to make enlightened inferences concerning market conduct, one 
should be fairly knowledgeable of factors affecting pricing and output 
policies of firms under various market conditions. There is some room 
for doubt that the average jury possesses such a high degree of 
economic sophistication. Neither is it certain that a jury will 
2 
acquire this needed sophistication during the course of a trial" Indeed 
it seems quite possible that under certain market conditions, a firm 
which is behaving independently, in a perfectly legal, profit seeking 
fashion runs a serious risk of antitrust prosecution. Further, it 
appears possible that the same firm may be found guilty of an antitrust 
violation on the basis of evidence which can be adequately explained 
with orthodox economic theory--and still no illegal conduct involved. 
One industry which has frequently been accused of behavior 
different from that which could be expected under freely competitive 
conditions is that of liquid asphalt. In a 1914 case, the State of 
Georgia charged liquid asphalt suppliers with combining to fix prices 
and to suppress competition in the sale of asphalt to the State 
Highway Department. In that landmark decision; the United States 
Supreme Court rules that a state does qualify as 11 any person who shall 
be injured" in the wording of section 7 of the Sherman Act, and is 
thereby eligible to receive treble damages under the Act. 2 More 
2state of Georgia v. Evans et~., 316 U.S. 159. 
3 
recently, several states have followed Georgia 1 s lead, and proceedings 
have been initiated against asphalt suppliers in cases in Massachusetts, 
Florida, California, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. 3 
Principal charges in these cases have been that suppliers conspired to 
fix prices and/or allocate market territories. One reason that there 
has been such interest in the area of asphalt pricing is that large 
quantities of liquid asphalt are purchased each year by state and local 
governments for use on highways. 
During the years 1961 through 1965, more than 114 million tons of 
petroleum asphalt were sold in the United States. Of that amount, 
almost 85 million tons, or 73.6 per cent of the total, were for paving 
use. 4 Indeed, in recent years the paving market has been consuming a 
fairly constant three-fourths of the product. A major portion of this 
is purchased by state and local governments. Between October 1961 and 
October 1965, the State of Oklahoma alone made direct purchases of more 
than 52 million gallons of liquid asphalt for paving use. The State 
paid over $1.8 million for the asphalt. Indirect purchases through 
private paving contractors amounted to about twice that quantity and 
dollar amounL 5 
Because such large quantities of asphalt are consumed each year by 
the states, the purchase of this material is of major consequence to 
3These cases are reported in the various issues of the Trade 
Regulation Reporter. 
4Petroleum Facts and Figures (New York, 1967 ed.), p. 229 and 233. 
One ton of asphalt is the equivalent of 5.5 barrels. 
5state of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials Corporation, et~., 
Plantiff Exhibit No. 99. 
4 
state governments. As a result, they tend to be very mindful of pricing 
policies of asphalt suppliers. Indeed, in their zeal to minimize the 
cost of the product, it seems possible that states may interpret sales 
and pricing pol~cies of liquid asphalt suppliers in such a way as to 
see anticompetitive conduct where it does not in fact exist. For 
example, if a state detects an absence of price competition among firms, 
failing to find direct evidence of an express anticompetitive agreement, 
the state may try to prove collusion by circumstantial evidence. This, 
of course, is a perfectly valid legal technique, A. D. Neale, a noted 
British authority on American antitrust laws states: 
... there are in practice two main lines of argument by 
which a circumstantial proof of collusive price-fixing may 
be built up; sometimes both lines may be used in the same 
case. One starts from the existence of an agreement--any 
trade association activity reflects an agreement of some 
kind--and seeks to show that the agreement, even though 
not expressly concerned with price-fixing, necessarily 
involves a significant restriction of price-competition. 
The alternative line of argument starts from the 
absence of price-competition and seeks to show that this 
state of affairs could not be maintained without 
collusion .... For this second line of argument 
various types of evidence are important. Uniformity 
of prices among ostensible competitors is only the 
starting-point. It is usually important to show that 
uniformity is maintained when diversity would be 
expected.6 
Neale 1 s latter point suggesting that absence of price competition alone 
is not per se proof of collusive price fixing must be emphasized. 7 
And as Neale recognizes, to prove a conspiracy by circumstantial 
6A. D. Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the United States of America 
(New York, 1968), p-:--4°9. -- - - -
7While it is true that price fixing (along with group boycotts, 
agreements to divide markets, and tie-in sales) is illegal per se, 
this is very different from ruling that price uniformity is per se 
proof of price fixing. 
evidence, it is important to show that the observed price .behavior is 
different from that which should be expected under freely competitive 
conditions. This expected market behavior depends, of course, on 
relevant characteristics of the product and market in question. This 
study centers around the testing of two hypotheses pertinent to this 
issue. Formally stated, they are: 1) Because of some special market 
conditions peculiar to the liquid asphalt industry, firms in that 
industry are particularly susceptible to antitrust involvement; and, 
2) Because of these same market conditions, an asphalt supplier may 
well be found guilty of an antitrust violation when in fact the firm 1 s 
conduct conforms to that which could be expected of an independently-
acting, profit-maximizing firm. 
5 
To test these hypotheses, the study focuses on the Oklahoma case, 
State of Oklahoma v, Allied Materials Corporation, et !l..· This 
particular case was chosen for two principal reasons. First, this case 
is perhaps the most important of the recent asphalt cases in terms of 
economics. In it; the State of Oklahoma attempted to prove that a 
conspiracy existed among major asphalt suppliers. Being a case in which 
market conduct could only be inferred on the basis of circumstantial 
evidence and economic theory, the line of attack taken by the Sta,te 
contained elements of each approach mentioned by Neale above. r8e 
primary emphasis, however, was on the second alternative. A second 
reason for selecting this particular case is that, unlike most of the 
other cases in which the defendants either entered nolo contendere 
pleas, or else there was direct evidence of a collusive agreement, the 
Oklahoma firms chose to fight the charges in court.. As a result, almost 
5000 pages of testimony generated evidence which makes it possible to 
examine this case more closely than is possible in the other cases, 
6 
The study proceeds as follows: Chapter II deals with certain 
aspects of market structure, An attempt is made to describe those 
factors which might be expected to influence significantly the nature 
of pricing and competition by Oklahoma asphalt suppliers, First, an 
introduction to the nature and uses of the product is included. This 
1s followed by a brief discussion of technological factors governing 
the production of asphalt. Closely related to this is a description of 
cost of production considerations. Next, data are presented concerning 
the classes of buyers of Oklahoma-produced liquid asphalt, the nature 
of demand for the product, and potential as well as established 
suppliers in the market area, Other factors, such as the method by 
which contracts are let, and especially spatial dimensions of the 
market are analyzed, 
Once the basic market characteristics are described, an attempt is 
made to explain with economic theory the behavior one might expect of 
firms operating under such market conditions. This is undertaken in 
Chapter III. It should be emphasized, however, that the function of 
Chapter III is not to attempt to explain definitively the actual conduct 
of Oklahoma asphalt suppliers between October, 1961 and October, 1965. 
Such is the function of the courts, and to say that the court was either 
correct or incorrect in the Oklahoma case is neither appropriate nor 
necessary for the development of this study, To test the hypotheses in 
question, it is only necessary in Chapter III to explain the behavior 
one could logically expect of firms operating under the conditions 
described in Chapter II. The approach used here is to note incentives 
7 
of firms to react in one way or another. It is important to realize, 
though, that the mere existence of an economic incentive for firms to 
behave in a certain fashion does not necessarily mean that they will so 
behave. Thus Chapter III should be interpreted only as an economic 
analysis of expected behavior of Oklahoma asphalt suppliers. 
Chapter IV deals with the specifics of the Oklahoma case. The 
allegations of the State, the factors behind the State 1 s decision to 
initiate the proceedings, its presentation of the case, and the defense 
are presented. This information is taken directly from the trial 
transcript. Finally, the information obtained in the first four 
chapters is analyzed in an attempt to confirm or reject the two 
hypotheses. 
In Chapter V attention is turned to matters of public policy. 
There are some important policy implications which can be drawn from 
this study. Emphasis in Chapter V is placed on national policy 
implications, but the case also .holds some implications for the 




Before one may intelligently analyze expected pricing and output 
policies of firms in a particular industry, he must have at his disposal 
certain information about that industry. The purpose of this chapter is 
to provide such information by examining those market characteristics 
which might be expected to influence significantly the nature of competi-
tion and market behavior by the firms in question. Specifically,_ the 
task at hand is to analyze the market structure faced by Oklahoma 
asphalt s~ppliers. 
The Product 
Asphalt is defined by the American Society for Testing and 
Materials as 11 a dark brown to black cementitious material, solid or 
semisolid in consistency, in which the predominating constituents are 
bitumens which occur in nature as such or are obtained as residua in 
refining petroleum. 111 Asphalt is used in roofing, floor covering, 
paints, auto brake lining, as insulation for wires, fiber conduits and 
1L W. Corbett, Arnold J. Heiberg, and R. B. Lewis, 11Asphalt, 11 
Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology {New York, 1963), II, p" 762, 
8 
refrigerators, and in various other industrial uses. Its primary use, 
however, and the one of concern here, is that of highway construction 
9 
and maintenance. Some of the properties of asphalt that cause it to be 
so extensively used as a paving material are that it is a powerful 
cement, readily adhesive, highly waterproof, and durable, 2 While 
asphalt is a solid or semisolid at normal atmospheric temperatures, it 
can be used as a paving material only when in liquid form. This trans-
formation from solid to liquid may be accomplished by blending the 
asphalt with other, lighter petroleum products and heating. These 
blends, or 11 cutbacks 11 as they are called, vary according to the type 
and amount of diluent used. Once cut back and heated, the liquid 
asphalt may be applied to the road where the distillate evaporates, 
leaving behind a cement-like asphalt. 
There are three general types of liquid asphalt which differ mainly 
in the diluent used. These are SC (slow-curing), MC (medium-curing), 
and RC (rapid-curing). RC type contains a naptha or gasoline-type 
diluent of high volatility. MC contains a kerosene-type diluent of 
relatively high volatility, and the seldom used SC variety contains a 
relatively low volatility oil. In each instance the diluent is applied 
to an asphaltic base substance, asphalt cement) This raw asphalt 
cement (AC) is a fourth form in which the product is sometimes sold. 
Within each of the types, there are different grades, depending on the 
amount of diluent used. Each state establishes specifications which 
each type and grade must meet. While these specifications may vary 
2Asphalt Handbook (New York, 1947), p. 7. 
3Herbert Abraham, Asphalt and Allied Substances (6th'ed., 
Princeton, 1962), II I, p. 124. -
10 
from state to state, it should be realized that within grades, asphalt 
is a homogeneous product, One batch of asphalt which meets state 
specifications is identical to any other batch which meets that same 
state's specifications.4 MC is the principal form in which the product 
is sold for road repair use and therefore receives the primary emphasis 
in this study, 
Supply 
Suppliers 
There are eight companies that sell liquid asphalt in Oklahoma, 
They are: Allied Materials Corporation, Apco Oil Company, Inland 
Asphalt, Inc,, Kerr-McGee Oil Company, Monarch Refineries, Inc,, 
Phillips Petroleum Company, Riffe Petroleum Company, and Sunray DX Oil 
Company, Five of the firms, Allied, Apco, DX, Kerr-McGee, and Phillips 
produce their own asphalt. Riffe, Inland and Monarch produce no 
asphalt, but market for others, or operate as 11 jobbers. 11 Riffe has 
marketed the asphalt produced by the Bell Oil and Gas Refinery of 
Ardmore, Oklahoma since 1957. In 1958, Riffe began marketing all the 
asphalt refined by Champlin 1 s Ardmore and Enid, Okla.homa refineries. 
Inland, which during its corporate history has also been known as the 
Baxter Land Corporation and the Redstone Asphalt and Petroleum Company, 
operates an asphalt blending facility located in Ponca City, Oklahoma, 
Inland purchases the residual materials and further processes them into 
4That is, one load of Oklahoma MC-2 is identical to every other 
load of Oklahoma MC-2. But it may (and in fact usually does) differ 
from a Kansas MC-2. For example, throughout the time covered by the 
suit, Oklahoma AC-3 was not acceptable to the State of Kansas as an 
A.C-3. 
11 
specification asphalts, Actually, Riffe and Inland should not be 
considered separate companies, as both are wholly-owned subsidiaries of 
CBK Industries, Inc., of Kansas City, Missouri, Monarch is a small 
jobber which markets for the Trumbull Oil Company which has a refinery 
in Oklahoma City. 5 
These eight firms operate ten asphalt producing and/or storage 
plants in the State of Oklahoma. Figure 1 shows the geographic loca-
tion of these plants over the State. The significance of this 
geographic distribution is discussed in Chapter III. Table I provides 
information as to ownership, production capacities, and storage 
capacities of the facilities. Two points need to be noted here to 
help clarify Table I. First, two of the Oklahoma refineries, Champlin 
and Sunray DX, have facilities for producing coke 1n lieu of asphalt. 
Truman Rucker, a member of the Sunray DX Board of Directors and also 
their legal counsel, testified that his company normally produces 
asphalt during the spring and summer, and then switches to coke pro-
duction during the fall and winter months when there is little or no 
road work being done. 6 Table 1 gives coking capacity in tons for these 
firms. Second, the table does not make sufficiently clear the critical 
nature of storage capacities. Actually, inadequate storage facilities 
5The corporate history of some of these firms is quite involved. 
Several of the firms underwent name and/or ownership changes both 
during and after the time period covered in the Oklahoma case. Also, 
some of the refineries have changed hands since the State of Oklahoma 
initiated proceedings. Where these changes are of no real significance 
relative to this study, they have been ignored. 
6state of Oklahoma v, Allied Materials Corporation, et~., Trial 
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*Crude capacities are expressed in barrels per calendar day. Asphalt capacities are in 
barrels per steam day. Calendar day figures may be converted to steam day equivalents by 
multiplying by 0.9. 
**No asphalt was produced at Grandfield. Storage facilities there were used to store part 
of Bell's Ardmore production. 
Source: This table was compiled on the basis of testimony by company officials in State of 
Oklahoma v. Allied Materials, et al., plus data obtained from "Survey of Operating Refineries in 
the United States" published annui'fly by the Oil and Gas Journal; and Moody's Industrial Manual. w 
seems to be a persistent problem with which asphalt producers must 
liveo 7 
Asphalt Refiners Association 
14 
A final note concerning the suppliers which should be included 
here deals with the existence of an Asphalt Refiners Association. This 
association was formed in 1954 and included all the Oklahoma asphalt 
suppliers listed above. According to Truman Rucker, previously 
identified, this association was formed for the sole purposes of 
promoting asphalt and combating the Portland Cement Association. 
Portland cement is, of course; asphalt's major competition as a paving 
material. The contention of Rucker and all members of the Asphalt 
Refiners Association is that it played no role in pricing and sales 
policies of its members. 8 The State, on the other hand, contended that 
the Association is the instrument through which its members conspired 
to fix prices and allocate market territories. Whether or not the 
existence of this Association is of any significance relative to this 
case depends, of course, on which of the two contentions is fact. 
Without speculating on that issue here, it should simply be noted that 
a corporation is not legally barred from contact with its competitors. 
By court decisions, a competitor 
7see, for example, the testimony of Ray L. Felts, Executive Vice 
President for Riffe. Ibid., XXXIII, pp. 3546-35470 Frank C. Love, 
President of Kerr-McGee also emphasized heavily the persistent 
inadequacy of storage facilitieso Ibido, XXX, pp. 3256. 
81bido, I, p. 580 
may JOln trade associations in which members meet, 
statistics on past transactions are compiled, and proce-
dures for detecting antisocial practices, such as fraud, 
are established. He may likewise participate in adver-
tising programs and utilize common facilities organized 
by his competitors to promote the best interests of his 
industry, where access to these joint projects is 
available to all members of the industry.9 
15 
Thus the mere existence of the Asphalt Refiners Association should not 
be taken as per se evidence of illegality. 
Potential Suppliers 
Potential market entrants, as well as the actual suppliers, may be 
expected to influence the nature of competition within a market. While 
there could conceivably be a large number of possible suppliers of 
liquid asphalt for the Oklahoma Highway Department from the surrounding 
states, only those from Kansas are considered here. The reason for so 
limiting this section is that it is the Kansas refineries which were 
named by the State of Oklahoma as parties to the conspiracy to allocate 
market territories. 
There are nine asphalt producing refineries in the State of Kansas. 
These include two refineries in El Dorado, one owned by Skelly Oil 
Company, the other by American Petrof'i na; a Mo bi 1 refinery in Aug us ta; 
two Consumers Cooperative refineries, one in Coffeyville, the other in 
Phillipsburg; a Phillips refinery in Kansas City; the Century Refinery 
in Shallow Water; an Apco refinery in Arkansas City; and until late 
1963, a Derby Refining Company plant in Wichita. Table II gives the 
9Jerrold G. Van Cise, The Federal Antitrust Laws (Washington, D.C., 
1967), p. 31. Van Ci se ci testhe cases from which each of these 
decisions is taken. 
productive capacities of these refineries, and Figure 2 shows the 
location of each plant. 
TABLE II 
OWNERSHIP, LOCATION, AND CAPACITIES OF LIQUID 
ASPHALT PRODUCERS IN KANSAS, 1961-1965 
Asphalt Coke 
16 
Crude Refining Producing Capacity 
Owner Pl ant Location Capacity (b/cd) Cap. (b/sc) (tons) 
American 
Petrofina El Dorado 21 ,400 2,800 
Apco Arkansas City 19,500 1 ,300 
Century Shallow Water 3,600 800 
Consumers 
Cooperative Coffeyville 26,000 1,200 250 
Consumers 
Cooperative Phillipsburg 14,500 l ,975 
Derby Wichita 21 ,500 2,300 150 
Mobil A.ugusta 45,000 7,000 
Phillips Kansas City 70,000 3,000 
Skelly El Dorado 48,000 3,000 500 
Source: 11 Survey of Operating Refineries in the United States, 11 
Oil and Gas Journal, Annual Reports. 
While all the above were mentioned as co-conspirators in the 
litigation, not all can be considered serious contenders for the 
Oklahoma market. For example, the Consumers Cooperative refinery in 
Phillipsburg is located in north central Kansas, some 200 miles above 
the Oklahoma line. The Coffeyville plant did not even produce 
• Phillipsburg 
• Shallow Water 
• El Dorado 
Wichita • • Augusta 
• Arkansas Cit 






specification asphalt during the time covered by the suit. The 
Phillips refinery in Kansas City lies over 150 miles away from the 
Oklahoma market. As such, it is much better situated to bid into 
Missouri, a deficit asphalt producing state, than into Oklahoma, a 
surplus state. Some of the other refineries, however, must be con-
sidered seriously as potential entrants into the Oklahoma market. 
Among these is the Apco refinery in Arkansas City, which lies less 
18 
than ten miles north of the Oklahoma line. The Skelly and American 
Petrofina refineries in El Dorado lie about 65 miles above the Oklahoma-
Kansas border. And the large Mobile refinery, which produces about 80 
million gallons of asphalt per year, is located in Augusta which is 
approximately 45 miles away from Oklahoma. These firms definitely 
should not be ruled out of contention for the Oklahoma market solely on 
geographic considerations. 
While it is a bit premature to fully develop this point, it must 
be noted that the distance from the market is significant for reasons 
other than the obvious one of transportation costs. For one thing, the 
asphalt is sold hot and is transported hot by Oklahoma Highway Depart-
ment trucks to the job site for immediate use with no reheating. Also, 
the Highway Department retains the privilege of returning the asphalt in 
case inclement weather should occur between the time of pick up and use. 
All three of these factors tend to reinforce the competitive disadvan-
tage of firms some distance from the market. 
Technology, Costs. and the Supply of Asphalt 
Refining technology places significant limitations on the ability 
of refiners to control the supply of asphalt. The petroleum refiner 
19 
normally does not have the independent choice of producing more or less 
asphalt. The amount of asphalt produced depends largely on the size of 
the throughput of the refinery. Actually, asphalt is a residium of the 
refining process, coming off the bottom of the barrel. By volume, it 
may vary from less than 5 per cent to more than 75 per cent of a barrel 
of crude; depending on the nature of the crude and technology.lo In 
Oklahoma the asphalt content per barrel of crude runs at near 10 per 
cent, while as a national average, Mclean and Haigh place the figure at 
nearer 3 per cent. 11 Some refineries have the option of producing coke 
in lieu of asphalt, but as is shown in Table I, that option is a very 
limited one in Oklahoma. 
While asphalt is only one of many products obtained from the 
petroleum refining process, it does not meet the standard economic 
definition of a "truly joint" product. That term is normally reserved 
for products which must be produced together and only in constant 
proportions. 12 Asphalt can more accurately be classified as a 11 by-
product11. Accountants term as by-products "the one or more products of 
10w. L. Nelson and Suresh Patel, "How Much Asphalt in Crude Oil?" 
Oil and Gas Journal, February 17, 1964, pp. 120-123, and W. L. Nelson, 
"AsphaltTnVarious World Crude Oils, 11 Oil and Gas Journal, December 7, 
1964, pp. 170-171. It also should be noted that while not all asphalt 
is obtained through the petroleum refining process, today petroleum-
derived asphalt represents over 90 per cent of total asphalt and asphalt 
products sold in the United States. Corbett, Herberg and Lewis, p. 766. 
Further, there are only a few minor occurrences of pure asphalt found 
in Oklahoma, and none of these has any commercial importance. Abraham, 
p. 140. 
11 John G. Mclean and Robert Haigh, The Growth of Integrated Oil 
Companies (Boston, 1954), p. 650. - - --
12Fritz Machlup, The Economics of Sellers• Competition: Model 
Analysis of Sellers' Conduct {Baltimore, 1952), p. 21. 
20 
relatively small value produced simultaneously with a product of greater 
value. 1113 Obviously, the value of asphalt obtained from a barrel of 
crude depends on its price and volume relative to other refinery 
products, but the value of asphalt does run significantly lower than 
that of the 11 main products 11 such as gasoline. 
According to Alan Manne, asphalt would have qualified as a joint 
product prior to the introduction of the 11 cracking process 11 , but since 
1913 refiners have had some control over the proportions of the product-
mix.14 But even though the refiner is no longer confined to fixed 
proportions, he still faces significant limitations on his ability to 
control the product-mix. This point should be emphasized. The refiner 
is still not free to vary his product-mix at will, but the chief 
limitation appears to be economic rather than technologicalo For as 
De Chazeau and Kahn point out, while it is conceivable that a refiner 
could produce all gasoline, it would not be economically feasibleo The 
cost of varying significantly beyond normal refinery output patterns is 
prohibitive. 15 So while asphalt is not a true joint product, it is 
still a fact that much of the cost involved in asphalt production is a 
joint or common cost and such costs cannot be accurately allocated to 
the individual products. Some amplification of this point is warranted. 
Machlup asserts that under such cost conditions, marginal cost of the 
13Adolph Matz, George Frank and Othel Curry, Cost Accounting: 
Management's ~perational Tool for Planning, Control and Analysis 
(Dallas, 1962 , Po 411. 
14Alan S. Manne, "Oil Refining: Yield Coefficients and Actual 
Prices, 11 Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXV (1961), Po 4000 
15Alfred Eo Kahn and Melvin G. De Chazeau, Inte ration and 
Competition.:!.!!_ the Petroleum Industry (New Haven, 1959 , p. 70. 
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individual product can be ascertained. In fact, he states that marginal 
cost is the only cost that can be unambiguously ascertained--that neither 
total cost nor average cost can be established without resorting to 
completely arbitrary rules of cost accounting. Machlup does admit, 
however, that even marginal cost cannot be determined from accounting 
records. He goes on to state that while it is theoretically possible 
to compute marginal cost, it is an entirely different matter as to 
whether marginal cost is indeed estimated by firms and of real signifi-
cance in business practice. 16 
Thus the relevant question is whether petroleum refineries do in 
fact attempt to estimate such costs and use them in asphalt pricing. 
The answer to that question seems to be negative. W. L. Nelson, 
technical editor of the Oil and Gas Journal, a leading trade publica-
tion, has addressed himself to the issue of allocating costs to the 
individual products (and specifically asphalt) on several occasions. 
His labors have led him to conclude that 11 the problem of allocating 
refinery operating costs to the many petroleum products is so 
complicated that a completely satisfactory method will probably never 
be available. 1117 Cassady reaches a similar conclusion. 18 Because of 
the impossibility or impractibility of accurately determining costs 
(marginal or otherwise) of the individual products, the practice is 
usua'l ly to adopt some arbitrary accounting method. One commonly used 
16 Machlup, pp. 24-25. 
17w. L Nelson, 11 How to Allocate Operating Costs to Each Product, 11 
Oil and Gas Journal, August 5, 1963, p. 108. 
l8Ralph Cassady, Price Making and Price Behavior in the Petroleum 
Industry (New Haven, 1954), p. 81. - ---
procedure is to allocate no specif'ic costs to the by-product at all. 
Any revenue resulting from its sale is then either credited to income 
or recorded as a cost reduction.19 
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Since refineries normally do not attempt to allocate costs to 
individual products such as asphalt, then cost cannot very well play an 
important role in the pricing and output decision. After concluding 
that there is no really satisfactory way of assigning costs to asphalt, 
Nelson further concluded that, 11 In fact, there is not much logic in 
determining production costs when factors other than costs are the ones 
that actually establish prices. 1120 , Once again, Cassady is in agreement 
with Nelson. He argues that because of the joint nature of costs, cost 
does not seem to be a dependable guide for pricing such products. 
Instead, he concludes that demand appears to be the only reasonable 
guide to pricing. 21 
Brief note should be made here concerning some other cost 
conditions in the petroleum refining industry. First, refining tends 
to be characterized by high fixed costs relative to variable costs. 
One study indicates that for conventional refineries ranging in size 
from 10,000 to 200,000 barrels per day and operating at capacity, fixed 
19Matz, Frank and Curry. See page 412 for an explanation of the 
varfous methods of handling joint or common costs. 
20Nelson~ 11 How to Allocate Operating Costs to Each Product, 11 
2lcassady. 
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costs may constitute as much as 73 per cent of total costs,22 It should 
be kept in mind, however, that this figure relates to total refinery 
operations, and not to the production of a single product such as 
asphalt. Second, not all costs in petroleum refining and processing 
are joint or common costs. Some, such as storage costs and the costs 
of further processing are directly assignable to individual products, 
Such costs tend to be a small proportion of total refinery costs, 
however. Most costs are of the type which cannot be unambiguously 
allocated to individual products. 
Thus, the following conclusions arise concerning the relationships 
between refining technology and the cost, output, and prices of asphalt: 
(l) Because of refining technology, the supply of asphalt is 
determined primarily by the size of the refinery throughput. 
(2) Total, average, or marginal cost of producing asphalt cannot 
be accurately determined. 
(3) The supply of asphalt appears to be largely a function of the 
demand for other petroleum products--particularly gasoline. 
(4) Production cost does not seem to be an important consideration 
in asphalt pricing since it cannot be accurately determined. 
22Mclean and Haigh, p. 563. Testimony by refinery officials adds 
credibility to such a conclusion. Because the witness obviously did not 
define fixed costs as an economist does, it is impossible to determine 
the exact breakdown between fixed and variable costs at the Kerr-McGee 
refineries. The testimony of Mr. Frank Love does, however, clearly 
indicate a high ratio of fixed to variable costs. Trial Transcript, 
xxx, pp. 3245-3253. 
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Demand 
Users of Asphalt 
It is possible to separate the users of Oklahoma-produced asphalt 
into four general groups. These are: (1) private contractors and 
industrial users, (2) local governmental units, (3) the Oklahoma 
Highway Department, and (4) out-of-state users. As previously noted, 
the primary use of liquid asphalt is for highway construction and 
maintenance. The Oklahoma Highway Department purchases large amounts 
of asphalt directly from the suppliers in a manner described below for 
the purpose of maintenance and repair of the State road system. In 
addition, the State contracts with private contractors for the building 
of new roads and major resurfacing of old ones. Special note should be 
made of the fact that the State does not own the heavy equipment 
required for heavy construction. Therefore, the State 1 s direct pur-
chases of asphalt are for road repair purposes. Asphalt used in heavy 
construct! on takes the form of indirect purchases through these private 
contractors. County governments also purchase asphalt directly from 
the suppliers. Aside from the private road building contractors, the 
remaining part of group (1) above consists primarily of industrial users 
using asphalt for roofing, but also for floor tile, insulation, and for 
other purposes. The last group, out-of-state buyers, consists largely 
of state governments demanding asphalt for highway use. Among the 
states included would be Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, South Dakota, Texas 
and Wisconsin. The major out-of-state buyer is Missouri. 23 
23state of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials, et 9.]_., Plantiff Exhibit 
Nos. 66, 80, 78, 68, 79, 72. 
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Some important distinctions between the different groups of users 
must be noted. Of the groups listed, the first, consisting of private 
contractors and industrial users, is comprised of profit-seeking 
entities. Groups (2) and (3), consisting of governmental units are 
not similarly motivated. There are significant implications inherent 
in this difference. Being a State agencyt the Oklahoma Highway Depart-
ment must depend on the Legislature for its funds. Thus the amount of 
asphalt purchased by the Department each year depends primarily on the 
amount of road repair to be undertaken and its appropriation. As a 
consequence, one could expect that the quantity purchased by the 
Department would be less responsive to price changes than would be the 
case with nongovernmental users. Further, when it is considered that 
there is not a good substitute for liquid asphalt in road repair use, 
this points to a lower price elasticity of demand in this market than 
would be expected in the other markets. 
Private users, on the other hand, could be expected to be more 
responsive to the price charged. Being profit-seeking firms, if the 
price of asphalt rises, they could be expected to cut back on their 
purchases and output. Further, since private contractors build new 
roads for the State where the Oklahoma Highway Department merely 
repairs existing roads, the private users have the option of substitu-
ting concrete for asphalt if the price of the latter is too high. 
Additionally, industrial users have more latitude in buying from out-
of-state sellers since they are not restricted as the Oklahoma Highway 
Department is, to buying specification asphalt. 24 Consequently, it can 
24This does not apply, however, to private contractors working on a 
State project. They must use specification asphalt just as the State 
does, 
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be concluded that Oklahoma asphalt suppliers face a more elastic demand 
from private users than from the Oklahoma Highway Department. 
Last, consider group (4), the out-of-state users. One would expect 
this market to have a greater elasticity of demand for the product than 
would any of the other markets, The reason for this is quite evident, 
Out-of-state buyers can find numerous suitable substitutes for Oklahoma-
produced asphalt. Missouri, for example, can choose from sellers in 
Kansas, Oklahoma, or Missouri. Actually, Oklahoma suppliers account for 
less than 3 per cent of the total petroleum asphalt sold in the United 
States. For the years 1961 through 1965, Oklahoma suppliers averaged 
only 2.7 per cent of all asphalt sold for paving purposes in this 
country. 25 Thus out-of-state users have a good alternative to buying 
Oklahoma-produced asphalt, and could be expected to exercise that 
option any time the delivered price of Oklahoma asphalt rises above the 
price charged by any other source of the producto 
Comparative Size of Markets 
The Oklahoma Highway Department is a relatively small purchaser of 
asphalt. Testimony of sales personnel of the various suppliers 
indicates that they generally sold less than 10 per cent of their 
output directly to the State. For example, Kerr-McGee normally sold 
only some 2.5 per cent to 3 per cent of its asphalt to the State. 
Riffe averaged selling between 4 per cent and 5 per cent of its asphalt 
output directly to the State. For Phillips, the figure ranged up to 10 
per cent. By far the largest user of Oklahoma-produced asphalt is the 
out-of-state market, Kerr-McGee generally sold from 75 per cent to 
25Petroleum Facts and Figures, pp. 229 and 233, 
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85 per cent of its asphalt out-of-state" Comparable figures apply for 
Phillips, Riffe, and the others, Aggregate sales figures reflect the 
relative sizes of the markets" While Oklahoma asphalt suppliers sold 
slightly less than 52 million gallons directly to the State during the 
period covered by the suit, they sold more than 108 million gallons to 
State highway contractors, and over 240 million gallons outside the 
State of Oklahoma. 26 
Method and Terms of Sale 
Since the antitrust activity which is the focal point of this study 
involves the sale of liquid asphalt to the Oklahoma Highway Department; 
the terms of the sales are important, During the time period covered 
in the suit, the purchase of asphalt for the Oklahoma Highway Department 
was done through the Central Purchasing Division of the State Board of 
Public Affairs. The sale was implemented by a contract designated 0072" 
This was a six-month, multi-award, open-end contract. Under this 
system, Central Purchasing would send invitations to qualified bidders 
to submit sealed bids on this contract. The opening of bids and letting 
of contracts was on a semi-annual basis. Being a multi-award contract, 
it could be awarded to all qualified bidders--not just one. Being open-
end, the State was committed to purchase asphalt only in 11 quantities 
needed and designated. 11 The quantity thus unspec;:ified, the State might 
purchase no asphalt at all from a contract holder, or it might require 
the individual contractor to supply the entire amount needed by the 
26state of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials, et~., Trial Transcript, 
XXIV, pp. 2610-2611. XXVI, p. 2788, and Plantiff Exhibit Nos. 86 and 
99. 
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Stateo Thus the firm was put in a position of having to guarantee 
prices on an unspecified amount, with time of delivery also unspecified. 
Once the bids were opened, Central Purchasing sent to all bidders a 
list showing what all bidders had bid. 
Another feature of the State 1 s purchasing practice is the fact that 
all sales were f .o,bo refinery. While a full discussion of the 
importance and implications of this practice is deferred to Chapter III, 
suffice it to say here only that transportation costs are not insignifi-
cant" They amount to approximately one cent per gallon for every fifty 
miles transported. 
Several other features of the State's buying procedure are 
noteworthy" First, it will be recalled that the Oklahoma Highway 
Department picked up the asphalt and transported it hot in its own 
trucks, and that it had return privileges on unused asphalt~ This 
returned asphalt could not be returned directly to the seller's 
storage tanko Instead it had to go into a 11 slop 11 tank to be rerun 
through the refinery. Another important feature of the procedure was 
tha.t the State would accept no bids from a refinery until it was 
completely satisfied that the refinery had adequate blending facilities, 
loading facilities and testing laboratories. Accordingly, until after 
the initiation of the suit, the State did not invite or accept out-of-
state bids, And finally, there was a cancellation clauseo A low bid 
would not necessarily guarantee a supplier a six month monopoly because 
the State could ask for new bids from all competitors within twenty-
four hours of the opening. Either party could cancel the contract on 
thirty days 1 notice. 
CHAPTER III 
CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the economic behavior 
which could be expected to prevail among firms operating under such 
market conditions as were described in Chapter II. It should be noted 
at the outset that the author does not purport to present an original 
and unique theory which definitively explains the economic behavior of 
the industry. Instead, in the preceding chapter, certain market 
characteristics were noted which could be expected to influence pricing, 
output, and sales policies of firms operating within the industry. The 
approach of th1s chapter is to apply existing economic theory to predict 
as accurately as possible the way in which firms might respond to such 
circumstances. 
In this chapter, pricing and sales policies of liquid asphalt 
suppliers are studied on two levels. It was noted earlier that several 
general groups of users of the product can be delineated. Consequently, 
each of the groups can be thought of as constituting a separate market 
for the product. One of these users, the Oklahoma Highway Department, 
initiated the lawsuit around which this paper is centered, and therefore 
receives special attention. Hence, the first task to be undertaken in 
the present chapter is to analyze that market. Specifically, what sales 
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and pricing policies would one expect to prevail within the Oklahoma 
Highway Department market? Second, it is necessary to examine price 
policies between the several different markets, 
Pricing and Sales to the.Oklahoma Highway Department 
The sale of liquid asphalt to the Oklahoma Highway Department 
exhibits rather clearly the basic characteristics of an oligopolistic 
market structureo While the term 11 few 11 is not quantified in the 
economic literature, the number of liquid asphalt suppliers in this 
market is sufficiently sma 11 to qualify as 11 few 11 by the standard 
definition of the term, 1 Actually, 11 few 11 firms are present if a single 
firm acting alone can significantly affect the market and influence 
other firms. A direct consequence of fewness of sellers is that 
oligopolistic firms are mutually interdependent, They must be 
rival-conscious since the actions of one firm affect the other firms in 
the industry, This feeling of mutual interdependence and rival con-
sciousness among the sellers is reflected clearly throughout the 
defendants 1 testimony in the trial, 2 
An o 1i go po 1 i st i c industry may sen a homogeneous product, in which 
case H is classified "pure oligopoly", or it may sell a differentiated 
product in which case it is called "differentiated oligopoly," While 
it has previously been noted that, within grades, asphalt is asphalt, 
1For a formal definition of 11 few 11 , see William Fellner, Competition 
Among the Few (New York, 1965), p, 41, 
2see, for example, the opening remarks of Mr, Coleman Hayes, 
representing Kerr-McGee, State of .Oklahoma v, Allied Materials 
Corporation, et tlo, Trial Transcript,. I, p, 66, 
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it must be recognized that there are numerous bases for product 
differentiation. Location of the seller is one such basis. Thus, 
even though chemically, asphalt may be asphalt, the output of one firm 
may not be a good substitute for another firm 1 s aspha 1 t because of 
transportation costs, inconveniences and time involved in delivery, 
and other reasons. Perhaps then it is most appropriate to categorize 
the Oklahoma market as one which approaches pure oligopoly. 
Since the spectrum of market structures referred to as oligopoly 
is so broad, it is difficult or impossible to be definitive or precise 
in oligopoly theory. Prices in an oligopolistic market may exhibit 
tremendous stab fl ity over time, or, at the other extreme, the market 
may be characterized by persistent price wars. Since price fixing 
charges tend to arise from the former and not from the latter condition, 
emphasis is placed on factors leading to, or contributing to, price 
stability in oligopolistic markets. 
Prices may remain stable over time as a result of collusion between 
sellers, or stabilHy may exist in th1:! face of independent action by 
the sellers. In either case, the concept of oligopolistic interdepend-
ence, mentioned above, is one of significance, and one which seems to 
be important in explaining the actions of Oklahoma asphalt suppliers. 
Because the actions of one firm may be expected to affect other firms 
in the industry, each individual firm has less than complete freedom 
of action. The result, as is pointed out by Professor James Hibdon, 
is that for any firm contemplating an action, the consequences of the 
a.ction are less certain of being favorable. 3 This uncertainty--
3James E. Hibdon, Price and Welfa.re Theory (New York, 1969), Po 285. 
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oligopolistic uncertainty it is often called--takes on a great deal of 
importance, The firms may try to eliminate it through collusive action9 
or each firm may react to it by becoming hesitant to initiate a change. 
In either case, the result tends toward stability. The question to be 
asked now is which of the two approaches is likely to be taken by firms 
operating under the market conditions earlier found to exist in this 
particular setting. To answer that question, several related sub-
questions must be examined. What are the incentives for firms to 
engage in collusion? Under what market conditions are collusive 
agreements most likely to abound? What are the incentives for firms 
to engage in independent action? Could collusion continue to exist 
over time in such a market as described above? 
Collusive Action 
Conditions Conducive to Collusive Agreements 
It is generally accepted that oligopolistic market structures often 
invite collusion. 4 In addition to reducing oligopolistic uncertainty, 
collusion may allow the firms to restrict output, raise prices, and 
thereby reap monopoly profits for the conspirators. Further, the 
existence of a collusive agreement may aid the firms in blocking 
potential new market entrants. The existence of economic incentives 
4The term 11 collusion 11 has become a somewhat ambiguous one, Its 
legal and economic meanings appear at times to be at odds. In order 
to m1n1m1ze confusion, this paper will presently reserve the term for 
those contracts or conspiracies forbidden by our antitrust laws. The 
term 11 co1lusion 11 will not be applied to informal understandings (such 
as some types of price leadership) which are not in violation of the 
antitrust statutes. This whole question is, of course, one of crucial 
importance in antitrust. Accordingly, it will receive expanded 
consideration in Chapter V. 
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for firms to engage in collusive action does not, however, guarantee 
that the opportunity is always available. Certain market conditions 
seem to be conducive to collusion while certain other market conditions 
tend to preclude collusion as an alternative available to competition-
weary competitors. What about Oklahoma asphalt producers? Does the 
market in which they operate seem to be one in which collusive action 
would be possible? While numerous writers have considered in varying 
degrees market structures conducive to collusion, two recent articles 
deal specifically with this issue. The articles, 11 Economics of Price 
Fixing" by Walter Bo Erickson, and "Nature and Significance of Price 
Fixing Rings 11 by John M, Kuhlman both attempt to enumerate factors which 
are conducive to conspiracy, 5 From these factors they attempt to make 
some inferences concerning conspiracy-prone industries. Comparing the 
conditions in the Oklahoma asphalt industry with Erickson and Kuhlman 1 s 
factors should provide some insight into the practicability and/or 
probability of such a conspiracy in the sale of liquid asphalt to the 
Oklahoma Highway Department. 
The major factors thought by Kuhlman to determine the profitability 
of a price fixing ring include: 
1) Number of firms. Kuhl man notes that the cost of enforc1 ng the 
price f]xing agreement rises as the number of firms increases. 
Erickson also considers this a prime factor, He cites industry 
structure, and especially the number of firms and their size 
5wa lter B. Erickson, 11 Economi cs of Price Fixing, 11 Antitrust Law 
and Economics Review, II (Spring, 1969), pp. 83-122, John M, Kuhlman, 
11 Nature and Significance of Price Fixing Rings, 11 Antitrust Law and 
Economics Review, II (Spring, 1969), pp 0 69-82, - -
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distribution, as the single most important factor in the development 
of collusive pricing. He argues that two types of industrial structure 
seem to be prone to conspiracy: 11 one, an industry having a very small 
number of firms; the other, an industry having a somewhat larger number 
of firms but with one or two of them predominant in size. 116 
When one looks at the Oklahoma asphalt producers relative to this 
first factor, it must be admitted that the industry would fall into 
Erickson 1 s conspiracy-prone category. There are eight firms which sell 
asphalt to the Oklahoma Highway DepartmenL Two of the firms, Bell of 
Ardmore, and Kerr-McGee in Cushing and Wynnewood, each have asphalt 
producing capacities more than double that of any other supplier. 
2) Simplicity of the product. Kuhlman argues that a very simple 
product which is priced as a 11 solo 11 rather than a more complicated one 
which is often sold in combination with some other product is most 
conducive to price fixing. He attributes this to the relative ease of 
policing the agreement when the product is simple. Asphalt is, of 
course, a product which is priced and sold 11 solo 11 • 
3) Technological stagnation. The cost of enforcing the agreement 
is generally less if the product is fairly standard and unchanging. 
Because of the fact that asphalt must meet State specifications, there 
is no room for product innovation in the market so far as the Oklahoma 
Highway Department is concerned, Thus it could be concluded that 
Kuhlman 1 s third condition is met in the present case. 
4) Sealed bids. Kuhlman suggests that the sealed-bid purchasing 
practices of public purchasing agents is particularly helpful to 
6Erickson, p. 85. 
conspirators" For this reason he argues that price-fixing is more 
prevalent in sales to government agencies than in sales to private 
firms. The following statement summarizes his position: 
The purpose of the sealed-bid, public-opening system of 
purchasing is of course to encourage the seller to engage 
in price discrimination, that is, to offer a lower price 
to the government than he normally charges to the general 
public. But the actual result may in fact be just the 
opposite. The public-opening of the bids makes the 
policing of the rings 0 activities relatively efficient 
and cheapo All who bid are advised at the time of the 
opening of (a) the identity of the successful bidder 
and (b) the winning price,7 
The bidding procedure followed by Oklahoma 0 s Central Purchasing has 
already been discussed, and is of the variety described by Kuhlman, 
The result is that any firm cheating on the alleged agreement would 
be immediately detected, 
5) Barriers to entry, Obviously, since the successful ring 
provides an incentive for new firms to enter the market, it is 
necessary to block their entrance to protect the ring. Since asphalt 
is merely a minor by-product of a petro"leum refinery and the capital 
requirement for building an efficient refinery is quite large, it 
seems doubtful that even a continued existence of monopoly profits in 
the sale of aspha1t would induce new firms to build asphalt producing 
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6) Inelastic demand. Both Kuhlman and Erickson agree that price 
fixing is more likely to occur in markets in which the demand is 
relatively inelastieo For as Kuhlman notes, "a government agency is 
probably more sensitive to its overall budget restraint than to changes 
7 Kuhl man , p . 77 . 
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in the prices of the particular products it buys. 11 8 It has previously 
been noted that the Oklahoma Highway Department 1 s demand for liquid 
asphalt may be expected to be relatively inelastic, 
7) Product differentiation. Kuhlman notes that where there is 
product differentiation, the difficulty of organizing and operating a 
price fixing ring increases. It was established in the preceding 
chapter that one load of asphalt which meets State specifications is 
identical to any other such load. 
Having analyzed the above factors, Kuhlman offers a profile of the 
conspiracy-prone industry. 
On an a priori basis, then, one would expect price fixing 
arrangements to be confined to certain industries and to 
be relatively unlikely in others. In general, the price-
fixers1 products will be relatively simple, will have an 
inelastic demand, and will generally be sold on a 11 solo 11 
basis. The industry will be relatively stable as far as 
tech no 1 ogy is concerned. Product innovation and sales 
promotion wi11 be largely absent. The product is more 
likely than not to be sold on a sealed-bid basis and it 
must be possible to limit or prevent new entrants from 
entering the industry,9 
It appears that Kuhlman•s profile fits the conditions surrounding 
the sale of liquid asphalt to the Oklahoma Highway Department rather 
well. Before attempting to make an assessment of the true significance 
of this finding, however, it should prove helpful to examine Erickson!s 
analysis of conditions conducive to collusion. He argues that six 
cr1tica! factors are largely responsible for the development of most 
conspiratorial arrangements. Once again, these factors are listed, 
exp1a~ned, and compared to the Oklahoma case. 
8Ibid., p, 73 .. 
9Ibid.' p. 74. 
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l) Structure of industry. This first factor roughly corresponds 
to Kuhlrnan 1 s first factor, and Erickson~s findings are discussed above. 
2) Lack of alternative means of 11 coordinatfog 11 prices_. Erickson 
contends that there is often a relative absence of alternative, non-
co11usive modes of effecting conspiratorial objectives. Such 
alternatives would include price leadership, cutthroat competition, 
mergers, and the like, This factor is one of extreme importance in the 
development of this case, and must be examined in depth. Thus a full 
discussion is deferred until the section dealing with independent 
action. There H is asked whether or not there is a satisfactory 
alternative to collusion available to Oklahoma asphalt suppliers by 
which prices may be stabilized. 
3) Depressed conditions in the industry. Ed ck son .argues that 
conspiracy often follows a period of depressed conditions in the 
1 ndustry. H4s studies have led him to conclude that often (in fact, 
·in eve"'y case re studied) the beginnfogs of collusfon or its revita11za-
t on occurred immediately after the industry had suffered certain 
economic reversals. The importance of this factor in influencing the 
likel~hood of a conspiracy in the present case is difficult to 
ascertain, Beca.use of the fact that asphalt is a minor refinery by-
product~ H can hardly be thought of as constHuting an industry in 
the sense Intended by Erickson" Thus is collusion likely to be borne 
of a period of depression in just the sale of asphalt, or perhaps the 
sale of gasoline, or the sa1e of an refinery products? Further, would 
the consp~racy arise because of depressed conditions in just one market 
or because of depressed conditions 1n all markets for the product? 
Erickson does not provide an answer to these questions, but it might 
be enlightening if one could get some idea of the economic conditions 
in the industry just prior to the time that the alleged conspiracy 
began" 
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The State of Oklahoma alleges that the origins of the conspiracy 
date back to the formation of the Asphalt Refiners Association in 
January, 19540 Assessing the economic condition of the relevant 
industry or market (whatever it may be) at that time is no easy task" 
There are no available data concerning the profitability of asphalt 
operations alone, and the profitability of total refinery operations 
would not seem to be a relevant variableo About the best indicator is 
the behavior of sales of asphalt in the years just preceding 19540 
Unfortunately, the Bureau of Mines did not report asphalt sales by 
individual states or regions prior to 1953. Asphalt sales data are 
available on a national basis, howevero They show that United States 
sales of petroleum asphalts for paving use rose steadily throughout the 
early 1950 1 s, going from about 3o3 million tons in 1950 to almost 10 
million tons by 19540 UoSo asphalt sales for all uses showed similar 
increases, rising from 10,5 million tons in 1950 to about l4o7 million 
tons in l954olO Neither of these trends indicates economically 
depressed conditionso 
Actually, it must be concluded that Erickson 1 s third factor is not 
readily applicable to the present caseo If one tries to adapt it to the 
case, however, what limited measures are available do not suggest that 
the Asphalt Refiners Association was formed in response to depressed 
condi t'i ons o 
10Petroleum Facts and Figures (New York, 1959 ed.), p. 348. 
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4) Inelastic demand-- 11 overcapacitt' o The importance of elasticity 
of demand and its relevance to the Oklahoma case are discussed aboveo 
Regarding capacity, Erickson argues that conspiracy is more likely to 
be attempted when there is potential overcapacityo His theoretical 
explanation is that the existence of overcapacity makes price leadership 
or other forms of informal price coordination difficult to maintaino 
Firms have a great incentive to cut price in hopes that competitors 
will not follow suito 
Assessing the capacity factor relative to Oklahoma asphalt 
suppliers is quite difficulto The primary problem is that capacity 
and overcapacity are not very meaningful concepts unless their defini-
tions take costs into considerationo And as previously indicated, 
average cost figures are indeterminant in the production of asphalto 
Thus what constitutes overcapacity? Erickson defines it as productive 
capacity that exceeds current outputo Accepting that definition, it 
seems unlikely that asphalt producers could be considered as suffering 
from overca.pacityo After all, the primary purpose of petroleum 
refining is not the production of asphalt. 
5) Strong trade associations. Erickson contends that, in general, 
the larger the portion of the industry encompassed by a trade associa-
tion, the more conspiracy is to be expected. The trade association 
does, of course, provide the mechanism through which conspiracy can be 
easily conductedo It has already been noted that all Oklahoma asphalt 
suppliers were members of the Asphalt Refiners Associationo Those 
suppliers who were not charter members of the Association joined as 
soon as they incorporated or began to produce specification asphalto 
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6) Strength of industry leadershipo Erickson 1 s sixth factor is 
also one which can hardly be applied in a beneficial way here. He 
argues that strong personal leadership--either for or against 
conspiracy--may have some effect on the creation of co 11 us i ve arrange-
ments. While this may well be true, there is really no way to test 
empirically the importance of that factor in the present case. 
Having considered Erickson 1 s six critical factors, how do they 
relate to the Oklahoma case? Erickson himself clearly states the 
usefulness of this analysis in pointing out that these six factors 
cannot be regarded as definitive analysis of conspiracyo He feels 
that their real value lies in the fact that they provide policymakers 
with a 11 mechanism that permits reasonable predictions as to which 
industries are particularly susceptible to collusion. 1111 Would 
Erickson consider Oklahoma asphalt producers particularly susceptible 
ta collusion? Looking at his six factors relative to the case, the 
answer to that question is not completely obvious. His first factor 
and the one which he considers most important, the number and size 
distribution of firms appears to fit the Oklahoma situation rather well. 
Whether there are alternatives to collusion, his second factor, remains 
to be analyzed. His third factor, depressed conditions in the industry 
pr1or to the inception of the alleged conspiracy, does not seem to fit. 
The Oklahoma Highway Departmentis demand for asphalt does appear to be 
relatively inelastic, but the existence of industrial overcapacity is 
doubtful. Since the industry trade association is all inclusive, 
Erickson°s fifth factor definitely fits. The sixth factor is 
lndeterminant. 
1l . Er1ckson, p. 89. 
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Several general conclusions can be reached on the basis of 
Kuhlman 1 s and Erickson 1 s analyses. On an a priori basis, it appears 
that Kuhlman describes Oklahoma asphalt producers as being conspiracy 
prone in the sale of liquid asphalt to the Oklahoma Highway Department. 
Erickson 1 s analysis would less clearly include Oklahoma asphalt 
producers, but might at least make them suspect. It is extremely 
important, however, to state clearly what this all means. The basic 
question asked was this: Given the market structure and conditions 
described in Chapter II, what economic behavior could be logically 
expected? To answer that question, it is necessary to ask if collusion 
is a course of action which the firms could follow. This must be 
answered affirmatively. But that does not mean that the firms did 
engage in collusion, or even that collusion is the most likely course 
of action for them to follow. It simply means that conditions in the 
market make collusion a real and perhaps even attractive alternative. 
Collusion over Time 
• )·=~-""'• 
Even though there exists both the incentive and opportunity for 
firms to enter into a collusive agreement, there is no guarantee that 
such an agreement will be viable. Once the agreement is instituted, its 
very existence may provide individual firms with a strong incentive to 
cheat on the agreement. Thus, the next question is this: Even if a 
price fixing, market sharing agreement were to exist between Oklahoma 
asphalt suppliers, could one reasonably expect it to remain in force 
over a long period of time? 
Obviously, there are some factors that tend to add stability to a 
conspiracy, and some that tend to be destabilizing. What seem to be 
the principal factors? Anything which provides individual members of 
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the conspiracy with an incentive not to abide by the agreement reduces 
the probability that the conspiracy will be effective and long lived. 
If firms have such an incentive, then the key question is whether 
individual firms actually can cheat on the agreement and profit by so 
doing. It can generally be expected that the operation of a successful 
cartel does provide the individual member with an economic incentive to 
cheat.1 2 This would surely be the case in Oklahoma if asphalt suppliers 
did have an agreement as the State alleged (and if the State were as 
responsive to price as it claimed to be). This is true because of the 
simple fact that none of the State's asphalt suppliers was able to sell 
its entire output to the Highway Department. All the suppliers had to 
sell large quantities of their product into other markets in which the 
prices were lower. Thus for any single firm, if it could individually 
reduce its price slightly below the cartel price, it would face a 
highly elastic demand. Even though the demand curve faced by the 
industry as a whole may be quite inelastic, the demand curve facing 
any one firm operating independently would likely be highly elastic. 
Consequently, it could expect to profit handsomely by such an action. 
But while Oklahoma asphalt suppliers would have had an incentive to 
cheat on the aneged agreement, could they reasonably expect to 11 get 
away" wHh such price chiseling? The answer is undoubtedly no. And 
12while it would be inappropriate here to use the term 11 cartel 11 as 
associated with the highly centralized European type, the term, as 
defined by Stocking and Watkins, applies. They define a cartel as 11 an 
arrangement among, or on behalf of, producers engaged in the same line 
of business with the design or effect of limiting or eliminating competi-
tion among them. 11 George Stocking and Myron Watkins, Cartels or 
Competition? (New York, 1948), p. 3. So defined, the State oY-Oklahoma 
was in effect accusing the defendants of operating a cartel, 
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the reason is that Oklahoma 1 s Central Purchasing would have discouraged 
such price reductions. The practice of public disclosure of informa-
tion on the winning bid price and bidder would make the policing of the 
agreement quite simple. No firm could expect to individually reduce its 
price and go undetected by the group. And once the secrecy is lost, so 
is the advantage of the price reduction. Thus it could be concluded 
that the State itself would mitigate against a natural tendency of the 
conspiracy to break down. 
If no firm could reasonably expect to be able to cut its price in 
secrecy, is it possible that a firm still might find it advantageous to 
abrogate the agreement and act independently? Is it likely that a firm 
might decide to openly cut its price in order to increase sales and 
profits? In the present case, such a possibility seems unlikely. The 
reason can be traced directly to the peculiar nature of the product. 
Since asphalt is merely one by-product of petroleum refining, its price 
can drop extremely low without causing a significant reduction in out-
put. Actually, so long as the price covers the cost of processing the 
raw asphalt, such as blending it to specification cutbacks, and storage 
costs, the firm could still profit by producing and selling the product. 
Under such a cost structure, no firm is likely to find it in its best 
interest to act independently and take on its rivals in an open price 
war. Indeed, any time that a firm's average variable costs are small 
in proportion to average total costs, that firm can be expected to show 
little affinity for open price wars. 
Another instance in which the operation of a successful conspiracy 
generates incentives detrimental to its own continued existence is that 
of monopoly profits. To the extent that the agreement is successful in 
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reaping monopoly profits for the group, it tends to attract new entrants, 
thereby threatening the stability of the conspiracy. Asphalt producers 
seem fairly well insulated from this threat, however, because of the 
nature of the product. Few.firms are likely to enter the petroleum 
refining industry because of the existence of monopoly profits in the 
sale of one of the minor by-products. There is still the possibility 
that already established refineries from other states might enter the 
market, however. And while Kansas refiners were considered co-
conspirators in the case, refineries in states such as Texas could also 
be considered as potential market entrants. But, once again, the State 
itself would tend to add stability to the conspiracy, for its asphalt 
specifications lessen the likelihood of out-of-state sellers entering 
the market. Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that entry would be 
sufficiently difficult to protect the conspiracy from potential entrants 
who would seek a share of the monopoly profits. This means that another 
natural destabilizing factor would be neutralized. 
From the foregoing analysis it cannot be definitively concluded 
that a conspiratorial arrangement would be stable over a long period of 
time in this market. It can be concluded, however, that there are 
significant factors which would tend to add stability to such an agree-
ment. First, State purchasing procedures would make the policing of 
the conspiracy easier. This would lessen the likelihood of a member 
cheating on the agreement. Second, cost conditions in the production 
of asphalt would lessen the likelihood of one firm's thinking that it 
could profit by initiating a price war which would kill the agreement. 
And third, the nature of the product plus State policies would help 
b1ock new entrants who might upset the arrangement. Thus, there would 
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be less in the way of incentives and opportunities for firms to upset a 
conspiracy in this case than is often found in such arrangements. In 
summary then, it may be said that there is no guarantee that such an 
alleged conspiracy could remain viable over time, but that there is 
little reason to doubt that the alleged conspiracy, if it existed, 
could remain in force over time. 
Noncollusive Action 
The preceding section seems to indicate that the performance of 
Oklahoma asphalt suppliers could have been the result of collusive 
action, However, this is only half the story. For as A. D. Neale 
indicates, to prove the existence of a conspiracy by circumstantial 
evidence, one approach--and the one given primary reliance in the 
present case by the State of Oklahoma--seeks to show that the perform· 
ance of the firms could result only from collusion. 13 Thus the 
crucial question is whether the performance of Oklahoma asphalt 
suppliers could have resulted only from collusive action. This section 
then will analyze the expected performance of the firms in the absence 
of illegal collusion, 
In the absence of collusion, would the performance of Oklahoma 
asphalt producers differ significantly from what it would be, given the 
existence of a price fixing agreement? With regard to pricing policies 
of the suppliers there is little reason to believe it would. Relative 
price inflexibility may obtain in the absence of--as well as in the 
presence of--collusiono The possible existence of a collusive agreement 
13 Neale, p, 49, 
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is not the only thing which could explain apparent joint action of firms 
in an oligopolistic market. Informal seller coordination may exist in a 
market in which there is no illegal collusion. 
The Kinked Oligopoly Demand Curve 
The concepts of oligopolistic interdependence and oligopolistic 
uncertainty, mentioned above, provide firms with an incentive to 
coordinate policies in some way--possibly legally, possibly illegally. 
One theory of legal coordination which is based very clearly on these 
two concepts and the resulting restraints on freedom of action by the 
individual firm is that of the kinked oligopoly demand curve" Paul 
Sweezy first presented this theory in 1939. 14 The theory attempts to 
explain oligopolistic price stability in terms of the way in which an 
individual oligopolist imagines his rivals will react to a price change 
by him. The theory is developed along these lines: The businessman 
assumes that his rivals will react differently according to whether he 
raises or lowers his price. He assumes that if he raises his price, 
his competitors will not follow suit, in which case he will lose 
business. If, on the other hand, he lowers his price, he assumes that 
his rivals will not allow him to cut into their shares of the market, 
so they will match his price reduction. Note that this is merely an 
imagined phenomenon. The result, however, is to produce a corner, or 
kink in the demand curve visualized by the seller. He visualizes the 
portion of the demand curve lying above the current market price as · 
being highly elastic, and that below it as less elastic. This being 
14Pau1 M. Sweezy, "Demand Under Conditions of Oligopoly," Journal 
of Political Economy, XLVII (1939), pp. 568-573. 
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the case he concludes that he would lose sales by raising his price, but 
would sell very little more by lowering his price. Thus there is price 
rigidity. 
It must be noted that the foregoing is an incomplete treatment of 
the theory of the kinked oligopoly demand curve, but for the purpose at 
hand it is adequate. The effects of rival consciousness and oligo-
polistic uncertainty are apparent, and the theory illustrates how these 
factors may place restraints on the individual firm's freedom of action, 
thereby reducing price flexibility. That is probably all that this 
particular theory can contribute to the present case. Its usefulness is 
somewhat limited in that it is based on some rather restrictive assump-
tions concerning the thinking of businessmen. 
Price Leadership 
Price leadership models need not be so restrictive, and may 
therefore offer better insight into pricing and sales policies of 
o1igopolists. Fritz Machlup distinguishes between two general leader-
ship arrangements: organized price leadership, and unorganized price 
leadership. He defines the former as a simple type of cartel which 
11 may be confined to a tacit a.greement that all members follow the price 
changes announced by a leader," or it may be somewhat more extensive. 15 
This type arrangement is illegal and falls into the collusive category 
discussed above. Unorganized price leadership rests on no formal 
agreement and is the type which is of interest here. 
Is it possible for this latter type of price leadership to arise 
and thrive in the absence of some type of formal agreement? Is there 
15Machlup, p, 491. 
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any reason to think that such a means of legal coordination among rivals 
is a real possibility? The answer to both questions is undoubtedly yes, 
For as Almarin Phillips observes, oligopolists recognize themselves as 
members of a group, and, not surprisingly, their behavior is similar to 
that observed 1n other small groups. 
A leader arises in the group, often by apparently 
spontaneous recognition and without the need for 
showdown fights. An unwritten code develops, partly 
from emulation of the leader and partly because the 
leader enforces certain rules of conduct . , , , 
Fighting within the group is closely regulated by 
the code, 
And as Phillips further notes: 
, , , with so few members, the parallelism of simple 
oligopoly may easily arise as 1 unconscious sensitivity 
to certain stimuli', or as a 1 learned response' based 
on past experience.16 
However it may develop, as the industry matures the firms often learn to 
avoid conflict within the group. When and if this behavior assumes the 
form of Machlup 1 s unorganized price leadership, it may fall into any of 
several types, George Stigler distinguishes between price leadership 
associated with a dominant firm and that of a barometric type. As 
explained by Stigler, in the first instance 
, , , the dominant firm , , , sets the price, allows 
the minor firms to sell what they wish at this price 
(subject perhaps to nonprice competition), and supplies 
the remainder of the quantity demanded. 
In the case of the barometric type, it refers to 
16Almarin Phillips, Market Structure, Organization and Performance 
(Cambridge, 1962), p. 26. 
... the existence of a firm that conventionally first 
announces price changes that are usually followed by the 
remainder of the industry, even though this firm may not 
occupy a dominant position.17 
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In addition to Stigler 1 s two types, price leadership also may be 
associated with the low-cost firm in the group. In such a case, since 
the low-cost firm can sell at a lower price than can its rivals, they 
have no choice but to sell at the price established by the low-cost 
firm. 
Would the possible existence of price leadership seem to offer the 
best explanation of the identity of bids received by the Oklahoma 
Highway Department and for their inflexibility over time? Actually, 
the pricing and sales policies of Oklahoma asphalt producers cannot be 
adequately explained except in the context of the spatial dimensions of 
the case, and that aspect is analyzed next. Thus, at present, price 
leadership will be considered merely as a possible cause for uniform 
and relatively inflexible price quotations which might be expected in 
the Oklahoma Highway Department market. More is said about the subject 
later, 
Spatial Aspects of the Problem 
In attempting to explain price and sales policies of Oklahoma 
asphalt suppliers, the influence of spatial factors cannot be ignored. 
To assist in illustrating the effects of locational factors on pricing 
decisions, a simplified spatial model is constructed here. This model 
17George J. Stigler, 11 The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid 
Prices," Journal of Political Economy, LV (1947), pp. 432-449. 
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is actually an adaptation of Hotelling 1 s early spatial mode1.l8 Begin 
by considering Figure 3. 
C A B D 
Distance Scale Location of Firms 
Figure 3. Location of Firms Along Linear Market Span 
Line CD represents the linear span of the market along which the 
consumers are evenly spread. A and B represent two firms, each located 
at its respective letter. To determine the effects of geography on 
pricing and sales policies, the following simplifying assumptions are 
made: 
(1) Consumers are situated along the market in such a way that 
each unit of distance also represents a unit of sales. 
(2) Consumers have a perfectly inelastic demand for the product. 
(3) Consumers always buy from the seller offering the lowest 
delivered price. 
(4) Each seller has perfect knowledge as to the total quantity of 
the product that buyers will take off the market, 
(5) Each seller quotes f.o.b. refinery prices. 
(6) Transportation costs vary in a linear fashion with distance. 
{7) Cost of producing the product is zero. 
Proceeding with the analysis now, leave the horizontal axis shown in 
Figure 3 unchanged, but add a verti~al axis on which will be measured 
price. Figure 4 incorporates this addition. The vertical lines rising 
18Harold Hotelling, 11 Stability in Competition, 11 The Economic 
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from A and B represent various f ~o.b. refinery prices which might be 
charged by the respective firms. The upsloping lines eminating from 
these price lines represent delivered price lines. They are upsloping 
because of the assumption that transportation costs equal some constant 
c times distance d. 
Since each customer will buy from the firm offering the lowest 
delivered price, then the boundary lines between A and B depend on their 
refinery prices. Table III shows the boundaries for the different 
prices shown in Figure 4. 
TABLE III 
TABULAR INTERPRETATION OF FIGURE 4 
If Firm A While Firm Firm A Has All Sales 
Charges B Charges In Market Area 
Pal pb1 CY 
Pal pb2 ex 
Pal pb3 CZ 
Pa2 pb1 No Sales 
Pa2 pb2 cw 
Pa2 pb3 ex 
It is readily apparent that if firms A and B charge identical f .o.b. 
refinery prices, such as Pa = Pb (or Pa = Pb ), then the boundary 
l 2 2 3 
will lie equidistant between the two suppliers. This must be true 
because the slopes of all the various delivered price lines are equal. 
If either seller is able to lower his refinery price below that of his 
competitor, however, he will be able to penetrate his competitor's 
territory and increase his sales. The crucial considerations are 
(1) whether he can unilaterally drop his price, and (2) if he would 
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profit by so doing. To analyze that problem, consider Figure 5. This 
figure is similar to Figure 4, except that initially the firms are 
charging identical refinery prices, Pa and Pb . The boundary line is 
1 1 
initially X. Given this situation, it is possible to measure the profit 
being made by each firm. Firm A1 s profit would be represented by the 
rectangle XCFG. Recall that zero production cost is being assumed. 
Therefore total revenue equals profit. Firm B1 s profit is the rectangle 
XDHG. Now what happens if either firm decides to drop its refinery 
price in order to penetrate its competitor 1 s territory and increase 
sales? Assume that Firm B cuts its refinery price from Pb to Pb . 
l 2 
Now its delivered price line becomes Pb2J while A1 s remains pa E. The 1 
new territorial boundary becomes X1 • What does this do to Firm A1 s 
profits? It obviously decreases them since A has lost sales equal to 
XX'. Ignoring momentarily A's reaction to his diminished profit, will 
B profit by the unilateral price reduction? The answer to that question 
depends ultimately on how significant transportation costs are. As a 
general rule, the higher transportation costs are, the smaller will be 
the increase in sales resulting from a given refinery price cut. The 
converse also holds true. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate this point. In 
Figure 6, transportation costs are very significant, thus the delivered 
price lines have steep slopes. In this case if B drops his price to 
Pb2 while A leaves his at Pa1, neither party benefits. A suffers 
because he is now selling less at the same price. B suffers because 






































































well as his new ones at the lower price. (This is assuming that B is 
unable to engage in price discrimination.) It is readily apparent from 
Figure 6 that the area X1 JKD is smaller than area XGHD. Thus Firm B 
would have no incentive to cut its price even if it knew that Firm A 
would not retaliate. 
Figure 7 illustrates a situation in which transportation cost is 
much less significant, thereby producing a flatter delivered price line. 
In this case if B drops his price by the same amount as in the previous 
example, from Pb to Pb , while A holds his constant, a different 
1 2 
picture emerges. Firm B will quite successfully penetrate A's terri-
tory, increasing its sales greatly. Obviously Firm A suffers. What 
about Firm B? In this case it benefits, increasing its profit from 
area XGHD to X1 JKD. What if, however, A is not willing to stand by 
and see B infringe on his territory, steal his customers, and decrease 
his profits? If A meets B1 s price reduction, then the original boundary, 
X, prevails, both are selling the same amount as before the price cuts, 
and both are making less profit. 
Summarizing, given the assumptions on page 50, if price changes 
made by one firm are always matched by the rival firm, both will always 
lose in case of a price reduction and gain in case of a price increase. 
Thus, if either firm believes that its rivals will follow its lead, 
there will be no incentive for it to reduce its price. But there will 
always be an incentive for it to raise its price. Actually, with the 
assumption of a perfectly inelastic demand for the product, both firms 
would continually prosper by raising their prices. If either firm 
believes that its price reduction will not be met, however, there may 
or may not be an incentive for the firm to lower its price. As is 
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c A X' x B 0 
Figure 6. Profitability of Unilateral Price Reduction: Significant 
Transportation. 
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illustrated by Figures 6 and 7, that depends on transportation costs. 
One extremely important qualification must be noted here. This entire 
analysis of the spatial aspects of pricing has been written under the 
assumption that each seller is knowledgeable of the quantity of the 
product that will be sold. Thus the only unknown variable with which 
the seller must contend is the reaction of his rival. If that assump-
tion is dropped, allowances must be made for the newly introduced 
uncertainty. If rival reaction and consumer response to the lower price 
are both unknown, the effect may well be to lessen still further the 
incentive of a firm to cut its price. If a firm cannot engage in price 
discrimination, then will it have any incentive to lower its price in 
hopes of increasing sales? First, since the firm must lower its price 
on all units sold, it loses revenue on sales to existing customers. 
Unless this can be offset by revenue from sales to new customers, the 
price cut will not be profitable. Thus the seller is placed in a 
position of cutting his price in hopes that rivals will not retaliate 
and that buyers in the adjacent territory will purchase enough from him 
at the lower price to offset the lost revenue in his 11 home 11 marketo If 
neither of these factors is a certainty, the price cut may then be 
considered too great a risk to take. 
One other case should be mentioned in this section. The results 
obtained above may be altered significantly if a firm is able to engage 
in price discrimination between users in different geographic areas. 
Figure 8 illustrates this. Once again the firms are initially charging 
Pa1 and Pb1. Firm A would like to increase its sales, but does not 
wish to 11 spoil 11 all his sales to the left of X by having to lower his 
price to these customers. Thus, if he can cut his price only to 
$ 
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boundary line customers, then the marginal revenue from the added sales 
is equal to the refinery price at which each buys. The effects of this 
price discrimination are shown by the lines corresponding to Pa , Pa , 
2 3 
and Pa4" In each case, the lower refinery price attracts new customers, 
but the old customers must still pay the higher price. Thus when the 
price is dropped from Pal to Pa2, the boundary line is extended from X 
to X1 • The marginal revenue (and profit) resulting from the added sales 
is shown by the rectangle XGHX 1 " If the price is dropped to Pa3 in 
order to add still more customers, the marginal revenue is X1 JKX 11 • The 
firm finds price discrimination an attractive policy because it allows 
the firm to sell to new customers without the necessity of cutting its 
price on all units sold. So long as the rival firm does not retaliate, 
there ·is always an incentive for the firm to cut its price to marginal 
customers" Thus price cutting seems most likely in instances in which 
a firm is free to engage in price discrimination and to act with a 
degree of secrecy. 
This same analysis can be expanded to include any number of firms 
as is indicated by Figure 9. In the case illustrated there are six 
firms, lettered A through F, and each located at its respective letter. 
The circles represent equal delivered price curves. All have the same 
f.o.b. price and transportation rates are identical from each location. 
The straight lines between the circles show the natural market bound-
aries. The analysis of pricing and sales policies in this case differs 
only in that as a firm lowers its f.o.b. price, it enlarges its market 
circle. And in this case it may be infringing on the territory of more 
than one seller. 
Figure 9. Market Boundaries for Firms Situated in a 
Nonlinear Market Span. 
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Applying the foregoing analysis to the sale of liquid asphalt to 
the Oklahoma Highway Department provides some useful insights into the 
pricing and sales policies of the suppliers. As a starting point, a 
brief review of some of the relevant facts concerning the sale of the 
product should prove instructiveo First, it will be recalled that 
Oklahoma 1 s Central Purchasing Agency issues multi-award contractso The 
quantity to be taken, if any, and the time of delivery are unspecifiedo 
All bids, or actually price guarantees, are stated f .o.b. refineryo 
Further, it should be recalled that transportation costs cannot be 
considered insignificant, amounting to approximately a penny a gallon 
per 50 miles hauledo Indeed, relative to the f.o.b. refinery price of 
10.25 cents per gallon paid by the State on MC asphalt, the transport 
cost is rather significant. The State buys so as to obtain the lowest 
delivered price. In addition, there is no chance that a firm might 
make secret price concessions to the State. Information on the winning 
price and bidder is made available to all bidders immediately after 
each opening. 
Now, how do the actual facts in the case at hand compare with the 
assumptions in the preceding section? First, the Oklahoma Highway 
Department does not have a perfectly inelastic demand for liquid asphalt, 
but the quantity purchased does not appear to be highly responsive to 
price changes. This fact does not necessitate major changes in the 
analysis. It does mean, however, that even if all sellers act together, 
they cannot indefinitely increase their profits by continually raising 
prices. Thus there is some upper constraint on the price of the pro-
duct. The relatively inelastic demand also means that if sellers 
become engaged in a price war, the Highway Department will not 
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substantially increase its purchases of asphalt. So the general rule 
that if all sellers act together they stand to benefit from a price 
increase and lose from a price reduction is still accurate. Second, 
the Oklahoma Highway Department does take transportation costs into 
consideration so as to obtain the asphalt at the lowest possible 
delivered price. Next, the assumption concerning the seller's knowledge 
of the quantity of the product to be bought is inaccurate. It has 
already been noted that the Oklahoma Highway Department does not specify 
quantities, and the effects of removing the assumption have been 
examined. No allowances need be made for the fifth and sixth assump-
tions. Sellers do quote prices f.o.b. refinery and transportation 
costs within the State are roughly proportional to distance. The 
accuracy or inaccuracy of the seventh assumption which deals with pro-
duction costs does not alter the analysis. It was included merely to 
facilitate the illustration of profit incentives of sellers. 
Now if one looks at the factors an asphalt supplier must consider 
1n pricing to the Oklahoma Highway Department, the cumulative effects 
of the many peculiarities of that market come into focus. Begin with 
a situation in which all sellers are initially charging identical f.o.b. 
refinery prices. Assume that Firm A finds that its asphalt inventory 
is pressing on its storage capacity. How will the seller react? Will 
he cut his price to the Oklahoma Highway Department in hopes of working 
off his excess inventory? First, he knows that he cannot engage in 
price discrimination within this market. He makes a single price 
quotation on a semiannual basis and all sales to the Oklahoma Highway 
Department are at that quoted price. Thus if he cuts his price, he 
will have to sell at that lower price even in his naturally protected 
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territory. Since there is no chance of price discrimination within the 
market, there is no certainty that the price reduction will be profit-
able. He must then consider other factors. Will rivals retaliate? 
Wi 11 they match, or even exceed, the price cut? There is no chance that 
the price reduction can be kept secret for reasons previously discussed. 
Thus would Firm A have any reason to believe that his competitors would 
sit idly by and let him 11 violate 11 their territories and reduce their 
profits? It is inconceivable that Firm A would be so naive as to think 
that it could unilaterally reduce its price. Given this likelihood of 
precipitating a price war, Firm A would probably look for another 
alternative for reducing its inventory, 
If the strong probability that his price reduction would be met or 
exceeded by his competitors is not enough to dissuade A from cutting 
his price, what else must he consider? Assume that Firm A sees rival 
retaliation as a risk which might or might not be worth taking, 
depending on other factors. Then A would need to speculate as to what 
would happen if rivals did not retaliate. As Figure 4 illustrates, 
there is no assurance that even a unilateral price reduction will be 
profitable when transportation costs are significant (given the 
impossibility of price discrimination). Even though a one cent per 
gallon price reduction would expand his market by fifty miles in all 
directions, there is no assurance of additional sales. And even if 
additional sales could be anticipated the time of delivery would not be 
known~ The excess inventory which caused A's desire to cut his price 
might no longer exist by the time of delivery. Thus the price reduc-
tion might not solve his immediate problem even if successfully made. 
It is even possible that by the time he is called upon to deliver the 
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asphalt, he might have a shortageo He then would have to go into the 
open market himself and purchase the asphalt needed to fulfill the 
contracL 
Reviewing his decision, the seller contemplating a price reduction 
would find very little positive encouragement, He would face almost 
certain rival retaliation, in which case his decision would be a poor 
one. On the other hand, even if rivals did not retaliate, he would 
face uncertain gains at best, no gains or a loss at worst. Weighing 
these factors, one would expect the seller to decide against the price 
reduction. 
Now the only questions which have not been answered are those of 
what determines the actual price and how does one explain its movement 
over time. Th~ best answer that can be given is that overall conditions 
of supply and demand dictate what the actual price will be. Identical 
price quotations from the suppliers could be expected for numerous 
reasons. In addition to the spatial forces analyzed above which tend 
toward identical prices, two or three others might be mentioned. One, 
since the overall conditions of supply and demand establish price, 
there is little reason to expect dissimilar prices on that basiso For 
as established earlier, cost of production differences are immeasurable 
and therefore not a ground for price differences. Since the Oklahoma 
Highway Department constitutes such a small part of the total demand 
for the product, demand should not cause price differentials between 
sellers. Also, Oklahoma asphalt suppliers must be considered to 
constitute a mature oligopoly. Since there are no basic forces causing 
price differentials, they--as do many mature oligopolists selling 
homogeneous products--arrive over time at a price with which they can 
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live, Asphalt price quotations for the various geographic regions are 
published regularly in trade publications such as Platt's Oilgram, so 
there is no real reason to expect that more than one price would 
prevail in a region, 
Price may be expected to change periodically over time as a result 
of natural economic forces. Total refinery costs rise with inflationary 
trends in the economy. Demand changes over time. The fact that all 
refineries raise asphalt prices at roughly the same time and by the 
same amount may be due to some form of price leadership and to the fact 
that pricing data are widely available in trade publications. The 
exact type of price leadership is not especially important. On an a 
priori basis, one might suspect barometric price leadership to be the 
most likely type, Cassady 1 s studies of the petroleum industry have led 
him to conclude that 11 the type of leadership pricing found in the 
petroleum industry appears to be predominantly of the barometric-firm 
type, .. 19 
Intermarket Sales Policies 
In regard to pricing to the various markets for liquid asphalt that 
were listed in Chapter II, the Oklahoma supplier faces a strong 
incentive to engage in price discrimination, While it was previously 
noted that asphalt suppliers could not discriminate in sales within the 
Oklahoma Highway Department market, discriminatory pricing between 
markets, or third degree price discrimination as it is called, is 
almost the only logical course of action, 
19 Cassady, p, 87. 
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Two conditions must be met before any firm may successfully engage 
in price discrimination. First, the seller must have at least two 
markets or submarkets which he can keep separate. Unless he can prevent 
the firm receiving the lower price from reselling to the firm having to 
pay the higher price, his price discrimination scheme will collapse. 
Second, unless the different buyers have different elasticities of 
demand, the attempt at price discrimination will be pointless. The 
reason for this is made clear below in the analysis of discriminatory 
pricing strategy. Both the prerequisites for successful price dis-
crimination are met in the present case. Elasticities of demand were 
discussed in Chapter II. Using just three of the different markets 
here for illustrative purposes, it will be recalled that the Oklahoma 
Highway Department's demand is less elastic than that of the other 
users. Oklahomais private contractors and industrial users of asphalt 
have a more elastic demand for reasons already established. And out-
of-state users of Oklahoma-produced asphalt have a still greater 
elasticity of demand since they have numerous substitutes available. 
It will be easier to explain how the markets are kept apart after the 
discriminatory pricing results are shown. 
Normally a firm engaging in price discrimination must decide on 
the amount of its total output, the distribution of sales among the 
several markets, and the price to be charged in each market. For 
reasons established in Chapter II, total output is treated as a given 
at some level in the following analysis. Costs are also ignored. Once 
again, this is appropriate for reasons already discussed. Thus the 
firm must be concerned only with the pricing and sales distribution 
which will maximize total receipts. This means that the firm must 
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always sell in the market in which an additional unit of sales would 
add the most to total receipts. It accomplishes that by distributing 
its sales so that marginal revenue in each market is equal to marginal 
revenue in every other market. Figure 10 illustrates the proper sales 
distribution and pricing policy for the firm. 
Markets I, II, and III represent the Oklahoma Highway Department, 
private contractors and industrial users, and out-of-state users, 
respectively. The seller would allocate his sales in the following 
manner: All quantities of less than ox1 units would be sold in 
Market I since marginal revenue is greater there than in either of the 
other two markets. For quantities greater than ox1, the seller would 
distribute sales between Markets I and II, adding units to each market 
so as to keep marginal revenue equal in each market. No sales would be 
made in Market III until the total quantity exceeds ox3 plus ox2. After 
that point sales would be distributed among the three markets, still 
keeping marginal revenue equal in all markets. Assume that the total 
output of the discriminating firm is equal to OX4 plus OX5 plus OX6. 
To maximize total receipts, ox4 units would be sold in Market I at a 
price of OP1. ox5 units would be sold in Market II at a price of OP2, 
and ox6 units would be sold in Market III at a price of OP3. Shifting 
any units of sales from one market to another would result in less total 
revenue. 
It should be apparent now why different elasticities of demand are 
necessary before price discrimination is plausible. The relationship 
between marginal revenue, price, and elasticity of demand is such that 
MR ~ P - P/E, where P denotes price, MR denotes marginal revenue, and E 
the elasticity coefficient. Since the firm maximizes total receipts 
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by allocating sales so that marginal revenue is the same in all markets, 
i.e., MR1 = MR2 = MR3, then when sales are properly allocated, 
or 
From this it is obvious that the prices can be different only if the 
elasticities of demand are different. If the elasticities were the 
same, the prices would be the same. There would be no price discrimina-
tion. It should also be noted that the price charged in the various 
markets decreases as the elasticity of demand increases, This is why 
one would expect that the Oklahoma Highway Department would be charged 
more for asphalt than would private contractors and industrial users, 
and why that group would be charged more than out-of-state users. 
Incidentally, this is the same analytical model that the defense 
applied in the case to explain differences in prices between the 
various markets for the product. 
Even if one could ignore the above-enumerated factors causing 
different elasticities of demand among the various buyers, the same 
discriminatory pricing results would obtain. Prices to out-of-state 
buyers would still be below the price charged the Oklahoma Highway 
DepartmenL For as Professor Harry W. Richardson has noted, in the 
11 real world 11 one frequently finds that the profit-maximizing monopolist 
finds it to his advantage to discriminate against buyers located nearer 
him. 20 This can easily be illustrated. Assume that two buyers have 
20Harry W. Richardson, Regional Economics (New York, 1969), 
pp. 21-22. 
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linear and identical demand curves for the product. But assume that 
one of the buyers, B, is located at the refinery gate. The other buyer, 
A, is located some distance away. Curves Da and Db in Figure 11 
represent the demand curves for buyers A and B, respectively. Because 
of the fact that buyer A must pay the cost of transporting the product, 
his demand curve is shifted downward by an amount equal to these costs. 
The unit transportation cost will be treated as a constant, Thus the 
vertical distance between Da and Db is the transportation cost per unit 
of product between the two locations. The horizontal distance between 
the two curves represents the difference in quantity demanded by the 
two buyers. The distant buyer will buy less because the delivered 
price he must pay is more when both firms are charged the same f .o.b, 
price. The two curves have the same slope because, aside from 
transportation costs, the demands are identical. 
By adding in the appropriate marginal revenue curves and a marginal 
cost curve (which for simplicity is assumed to be constant}, it is clear 
that the seller has an incentive to discriminate against the nearer 
buyer. By equating marginal revenue to marginal cost in each market, 
he will find that he should charge buyer A an f.o.b. price of Pa, and 
buyer B must pay Pb. It is also clear that within any specified range, 
demand curve Da is more elastic than Db. Any given change in price 
will bring about the same absolute change in quantity demanded on each 
curve, but the percentage change (and hence elasticity) is greater for 
curve Da. Thus once again, the more distant buyer, the one with the 
more elastic demand, receives the lower refinery price. 
The only question to be answered now is how the different markets 























Figure 11. A Geographic Price Discrimination Model. 
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profitable arrangement? The answer to that question may now be easily 
seen. Out-of-state buyers, who receive the lowest price on asphalt, are 
not in a position to resell it for several reasons. First, this group 
is comprised largely of governmental units, and as such are not profit 
seeking entities. Thus reselling the product is not their nature. 
Further, Oklahoma bidding procedures and asphalt specifications would 
exclude most out-of-staters from reselling for a profit. Last, but not 
least in importance, is the fact that transportation costs would make 
resales impossible. Private contractors and industrial users would be 
prevented from reselling to the Oklahoma Highway Department for much 
the same reasons. State bidding procedures and asphalt specifications 
would effectively eliminate them. For this group to be able to submit 
a bid, they would need blending facilities and an assured constant 
supply of asphalt. Given the conditions of the State's contract and 
the uncertainty surrounding the sale of liquid asphalt to the Oklahoma 
Highway Department, buying the product on the open market to resell to 
the Department simply is not feasible. Thus the markets could be kept 
apart easily and discriminatory pricing could be profitably practiced 
by Oklahoma asphalt suppliers. 
Sales to Private and Out-of-State Users 
As a result of the existence of both the incentive and opportunity 
for Oklahoma asphalt suppliers to engage in discriminatory pricing 
between the several markets, the relatively higher price paid by the 
Oklahoma Highway Department is easily explained. No collusion is 
needed to produce such a price structure. And while the great price 
stability in that market has been discussed, a greater degree of price 
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flexibility in other markets is also consistent with noncollusive 
action. One might logically expect stable and identical price quota-
tions to the Highway Department by the same sellers who were 
simultaneously making price concessions and charging lower prices in 
the other markets for the product. Consider, for example, the market 
consisting of private contractors and industrial users. This market 
differs from the Oklahoma Highway Department market in several important 
respects, and therein lies the explanation for lower and more flexible 
prices in the market. What are those differences? First, in quoting a 
price to a private user, the supplier knows when and how much of the 
product the user plans to purchase. Thus he is not required to make an 
open-end price quotation. Second, since the elasticity of demand 
appears to be greater, the seller may reason that a price reduction 
will more successfully induce the user to increase his consumption of 
the product. Third, the supplier may be able to discriminate between 
firms in this market, A fourth and very important difference is the 
fact that there is a possibility of making secret price concessions to 
a potential buyer. 
As a consequence of the above differences, greater price 
flexibility is to be expected in this market. If a seller desired to 
increase his sales now, what would be the factors he would consider and 
the likely outcome of his deliberations? Assume, as before, that the 
seller considers lowering his price in order to work off his excess 
inventory. In this instance, he could plan to lower his price on some 
sales or in some market territories without reducing it on all units 
sold. Not having to 11 spoil 11 his own market, the prospect of lowering 
his price to customers in boundary line territories would appear to be 
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a fairly attractive alternative. Further, he might expect to escape 
retaliation from his rivals since his price reduction would not be 
officially communicated to them. A small price reduction which would 
allow him to pick up a few marginal customers might well go undetected. 
Given this set of possibilities, the seller might well decide in favor 
of the price reduction. Thus one woulq expect a higher degree of price 
fl exi bil ity in the sa 1 e of asphalt to private users than to the 
Oklahoma Highway Department. Once again, such a result is completely 
compatible with independent action on the part of the suppliers. No 
collusion is necessary to produce such a result. 
What marketing policies could be expected in the case of out-of-
state sales? From the section on intermarket pricing one would expect 
the price charged out-of-state users of the product to be generally 
lower than in other markets. But what else might be expected? Suffice 
it here to make only a few generalizations. Any rigorous analysis of 
this question which might need exploring can be handled in the next 
chapter. Oklahoma asphalt suppliers face considerable competition in 
out-of-state sales. As they move into this market, the Oklahoma firm 
leaves the tight oligopolistic market at home and moves into a highly 
competitive situation. Consequently, one would expect Oklahoma suppliers 
to concentrate their sales efforts on areas in which they might expect 
to be able to compete most successfully with their rivals. Accordingly, 
they could generally be expected to avoid competing in surplus asphalt 
producing areas and concentrate on deficit areas. One might expect 
sales between surplus states to be small in quantity, infrequent, and 
to be largely confined to 11 specialty11 products. In general, Oklahoma 
suppliers might be expected to concede Kansas, a surplus state, to 
Kansas suppliers since transportation rates would put them at a 
competitive disadvantage there, On the other hand, they could be 
expected to compete vigorously for the Missouri markets. Missouri is 
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a deficit state, having only one refinery which is located at Sugar 
Creek, Oklahoma firms would be on relatively equal terms with refineries 
from Kansas and other surplus areas in the Missouri market. They might 
also be expected to sell into the northern deficit market areas such as 
Nebraska, Wisconsin, South Dakota, Iowa, and others, As is explained 
later, freight rates are so constructed as to make it possible for 
them to compete successfully with other competitors in sales to those 
areas, But in order to sell there, they would have to lower their 
refinery price so that the delivered price would be competitive, 
Conclusions on Pricing and Sales to and 
Between the Various Markets 
It has been noted in this chapter that Oklahoma asphalt suppliers 
might have both the opportunity and the incentive to engage in illegal 
collusive agreements. By acting as a cartel, the firms might agree to 
fix prices and to divide market territories, thereby avoiding competi-
tion and enabling them to reap monopoly profits. Comparing factors 
surrounding the sale of liquid asphalt to the Oklahoma Highway Depart-
ment with factors considered conducive to conspiracy, there is some 
evidence that this market is conspiracy-prone, There is also some 
evidence that such a conspiracy in this industry could prove viable 
over time, On the other hand, it has been shown that a geographically 
segmented market and identical price quotations could result from 
noncollusive action. As a matter of fact, the price quoted to the 
Oklahoma Highway Department could be expected to be rather high 
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(relative to the other markets) and price concessions unlikely, whether 
the conduct of the sellers were collusive or noncollusive, Furthermore, 
one would expect a geographically segmented market in either instance, 
One would also logically expect that price discrimination would be 
practiced in the absence of, as well as in the presence of, an illegal 
conspiracy. 
There is an important conclusion to be drawn from this. Virtually 
identical performance may result from noncollusive conduct as from 
collusive conduct, As a result of this, no inference as to conduct may 
be drawn from the performance to be expected within this particular 
market. But it is important to note what this conclusion does and 
does not mean. First, it does seem to indicate that on the basis of 
market structure and expected market performance, a strong theoretical 
argument cannot be made that only an illegal conspiracy could have 
produced the expected performance. Theory would indicate that the same 
performance could have resulted from legal or illegal conduct, This 
conclusion does not, however, answer the question of whether or not 
Oklahoma asphalt suppliers were acting collusively, Neither does it 
provide a confirmation or denial of either hypothesis to be tested in 
this paper. Only by examining all the State's evidence of the alleged 
conspiracy and seeing if it can be logically explained as a result of 
legal conduct can the hypotheses be confirmed or rejected, 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE AND CONSIDERATION 
OF THE HYPOTHESES 
On October 4, 1965, the State of Oklahoma filed a private treble 
damage suit against ten asphalt suppliers in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The State alleged that the 
firms had acted in violation of provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
of 1890. 1 This chapter examines several aspects of that case. First, 
the defendants and co-conspirators in the case are identified. Second, 
the charges against the firms are explained. Then, attention is turned 
to those factors which led the State of Oklahoma to ultimately initiate 
proceedings. Next, the State's development of the case is analyzed in 
some detail. The method by which the State attempted to prove the 
1Actua11y, the then Attorney General of Oklahoma, Charles Nesbitt, 
filed separate state and federal price fixing suits in 1965 against ten 
major oil companies seeking total damages of $37.5 million. The record 
shows, however, that early in 1966, District Court Judge Joann Mcinniss 
approved a motion by one of the defendants to stay proceedings in the 
state court pending outcome of the federal court case. The federal suit 
finally came to trial in late 1968 and was settled early in 1969. 
At the behest of the State, the case was tried by jury. The right 
to demand a jury trial is, of course, guaranteed by the Constitution 
and is set forth in Federal Rule 38 of the rules governing civil 
proceedings. See Paul R. Hays, Cases and Materials on Civil Proceedings 
(Brooklyn, 1947), p. 475. -
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charges and the evidence presented in so doing receives special 
attention. Following that, consideration is turned to the defense. 
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The paper focuses on the way in which the defense attempted to counter 
the evidence and arguments put forth by the State. Finally, judgment 
must be made concerning the accuracy or inaccuracy of the two hypotheses 
stated in Chapter I, 
Parties to the Suit and Charges 
Named as defendants in the case, State of Oklahoma v. Allied 
Materials Corporation, et .tl_., were Phillips Petroleum Company, Kerr-
McGee Corporation, Sunray DX Oil Company, Inland Asphalt, Inc., Riffe 
Petroleum Company, Baxter Land Corporation, and Redstone Asphalt and 
Petroleum Company. 2 Allied Materials Corporation, Apco Oil Corporation, 
and Monarch Refineries, Inc., were named as co-conspirators. Addition-
ally, the State named asphalt producing refineries in Kansas as 
co-conspirators with respect to certain of the charges. These 
refineries include Skelly Oil Company, Mobil Oil Company, American 
Petrofina, Derby Refining Company, Consumers Cooperative, and once 
again, Phillips. 
The State of Oklahoma alleged that the defendants and 
co-conspirators violated the Sherman Act and damaged the State in four 
ways. Following is a list of the charges made by the State: 
2It should be recalled that the corporate histories of some of the 
defendants are quite intertwined. As noted in Chapter II, Riffe and 
Inland are both wholly-owned subsidiaries of the same parent company. 
Further, Inland, Redstone and Baxter Land Corporation are all corporate 
names at one time or another for the same supplier. 
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1) The State alleged that the defendants and co-conspirators 
11 conspired and agreed to fix, stabilize and control the price at which 
asphalt would be sold in and to the State of Oklahoma. 11 
2) The State further alleged that the defendants and 
co-conspirators in Oklahoma 11 agreed to split up and allocate among 
themselves the customers and territories within the State of Oklahoma 
on the sale of liquid asphalto 11 
3) A third allegation by the State was that the Oklahoma asphalt 
suppliers and the Kansas asphalt suppliers 11 agreed among themselves 
that Oklahoma suppliers would not market in Kansas, and Kansas suppliers 
would not market in Oklahoma. 11 
4) Finally, the State alleged that the defendants and 
co-conspirators in Oklahoma ''conspired to monopolize the sale of 
asphalt within and to the State of Oklahoma. 113 
Factors Leading to the Filing of Charges 
In order to analyze the first hypothesis posed in this study--
namely, that because of some special market conditions peculiar to the 
liquid asphalt industry, that industry is particularly susceptible to 
antitrust involvement--it is necessary to look at factors leading the 
State of Oklahoma to suspect the existence of a conspiracy and to file 
charges. Obviously, the most formal and direct way of addressing the 
issue would be to obtain the information directly from the person who 
actually made the decision to file charges in the case, Accordingly, 
3state of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials Corporation, et~., 
pp. 25-40. 
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several attempts were made to elicit a response from the person who had 
been Attorney General of Oklahoma at the time of the initiation of 
proceedings. Three separate attempts to obtain a statement of factors 
leading the State to proceed with the case yielded no results. But 
while a formal statement by the Attorney General who filed the charges 
would have been interesting, the absence of such a statement presents 
no insurmountable problem in getting at the question at hand. A study 
of the history of the case provides a clear profile of the decision to 
prosecute. There seem to have been three factors of supreme importance 
influencing the State of Oklahoma to file charges. First, the State 
had long been aware of, and troubled by, the identity of bids by the 
defendants. As early as 1958 the State Highway Commission asked the 
defendants and alleged co-conspirators to explain their prices. One 
can easily imagine an individual with little expertise in such matters 
as viewing identical price quotations on so-called 11 secret sealed bids" 
as strong evidence of conspiracy. Add to this a second factor, the 
existence of a trade association, the Asphalt Refiners Association, 
and the State prosecutor might visualize the machinery for carrying 
out the conspiracy. The third factor appears to have been the influence 
of proceedings against several of the same firms in Missouri. 4 
4In the Missouri litigation, eighteen oil companies and seventeen 
of their officials were arraigned on September 8, 1965, in St. Louis on 
criminal charges for rigging prices on sales of liquid asphalt to the 
State of Missouri. All defendants in the case entered nolo contendere 
pleas. Fines totaling $609,500 were levied. Each individual also 
received a six month prison sentence which was suspended and replaced 
with a one year probation. Companies and/or officials common to the 
Missouri and Oklahoma proceedings include Allied Materials, Apco, 
Phillips, Riffe, and Sunray DX. For a full account of the Missouri 
proceedings, see The Oil and Gas Journa 1, August 2, 1965, p. 82, and 
NOl!o 29, 1965, p" 46" 
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Indictments were handed down in the Missouri price fixing case on 
July 22, 1965. Charges were filed in the Oklahoma case on October 4, 
1965. Such timing hardly seems coincidental. When it is recalled that 
the alleged conspiracy in Oklahoma dated back to 1954, the mere two 
month time lapse between the two case dates seems quite significant. 
Given these three factors, the State's decision to file charges is not 
at all mysterious. 
While the three factors listed in the foregoing analysis might not 
correlate perfectly with a listing of factors which might have been 
prepared by the Attorney General, they probably offer at least as good 
an explanation of the forces behind the decision to file charges as 
could have been obtained through a formal statement by that person. 
Development of the State's Case 
As a way of presenting the State 1 s case, each allegation is 
examined here individually, and, for each allegation, the general 
contention made by the State is summarized. That is followed by an 
explanation of the evidence and analysis presented by the State in 
support of its allegation. The task of critically evaluating the 
State~s arguments and evidence is deferred until the section dealing 
with the defense. 
Allegation I 
General Contention 
The State~s contention concerning the price fixing conspiracy was 
that it began with the formation of the Asphalt Refiners Association. 
That association was incorporated January 12, 1954, having as its 
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charter members Kerr-McGee, Allied Materials, Monarch, Sunray DX, and 
Anderson-Prichard (Apco). Riffe joined the Association in 1957 at the 
time of the company 0 s incorporation. Phillips joined in 1958 when it 
began producing specification asphalt and selling it to the State of 
Oklahoma and to Oklahoma contractors. No out-of-state asphalt supplier 
was ever a member of the Asphalt Refiners Association. 
In developing its case, the State averred that prior to the 
formation of the Asphalt Refiners Association, the suppliers submitted 
bids to the State which were different and which fluctuated up and down. 
But after 1954, all bids received by the State were fixed at a high 
level, and were virtually always identical quotations. The State 
contended that the odds against accidentally receiving simultaneous 
and equal price increases on a secret, sealed bid (as happened on 
February 21, 1956) were 11 something like ten million to one. 11 As 
support for its position that such a phenomenon must have occurred as 
the result of a conspiratorial agreement, the State pointed out that 
the members of the Asphalt Refiners Association fr~quently met in their 
/// 
Oklahoma City headquarters just prior to cori~fact lettings . 
. / 
As further support for its positjp;~ the State attempted to 
demonstrate that Oklahoma aspha;,~"suppliers had submitted bids into 
/ 
other states during the pevjod which exhibited a competitive nature. 
The hypothesis was tJ.:ci.t if Oklahoma suppliers always submitted high, 
identical, and •11flexible bids to the State of Oklahoma while sub-
mitting lower and flexible bids into distant markets, that must be the 




Evidence and Argument 
To support its contention that the pricing and sales policies of 
Okla.homa asphalt suppliers could have resulted only from a conspiracy, 
the State centered its economic arguments around its expert economic 
witness, Mr" Peter Max. Mr. Max is an economist with the National 
Economic Research Association in Washington, D.C., and had had prior 
experience as an expert witness in antitrust cases. 
The State began by attempting to convince the jury that the 
bidding done by Oklahoma asphalt suppliers was not consistent with 
competitive pricing. To accomplish this, Mr. Max was asked to contrast 
competitive with non-competitive pricing behavior. The response was 
that prices would ordinarily be expected to fluctuate under competitive 
conditions. They would show some volatility, and would differ between 
sellers. As sellers sought larger shares of the market, one would find 
fluctuating and nonidentical prices. But in a non-competitive market, 
virtually the opposite could be expected. Mr. Max testified that 
frequently there would be price uniformity and price stability. He 
stated that when prices did change, most often all suppliers would 
simultaneously announce the change, or else all firms would quickly 
follow the price leader. He stated that such noncompetitive prices 
would usually remain stable over long periods of time, but with all 
suppliers moving together when they did change--usually increase.5 
Correspondingly, Mr. Max testified that under a secret, sealed bid 
situation, one would similarly expect price fluctuations and differences 
5state of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials Corporation, et .!J._., Trial 
Transcript, XXIV, p. 2576. 
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among bidders in a competitive market. But in a non-competitive market 
one could frequently expect identical bids. Or perhaps in cases in 
which the conspirators had agreed on the winner ahead of time, that 
firm would submit the low or winning bid with the others submitting 
higher, 11 shadow 11 bids. 6 
Proceeding from that point the State asked Mr. Max to examine bids 
by Oklahoma asphalt suppliers to the State of Oklahoma and to contrast 
those bids with out-of-state bids by the same suppliers. In order to 
put his analysis in perspective, a brief review of the history of bids 
submitted to the Oklahoma Highway Department and to the various other 
states is necessary. 
Bids to the Oklahoma Highway Department7 
A study of the history of bids to the Oklahoma Highway Department 
by Oklahoma asphalt suppliers reveals the following: From 1948 to 1954, 
there were variations in the bids. No identity of bids was noticed 
until the bid opening of January 5, 1954. It was on that date that the 
Highway Department found that all suppliers had submitted identical bids 
of nine cents a gallon on RC asphalt. It should be explained also that 
at that time the Oklahoma Highway Department procured its own materials. 
Whenever the Department needed asphalt, its purchasing agent sent out 
6Ibid., XXIV, pp. 2577-2578. 
7This information was obtained from numerous exhibits plus numerous 
and scattered bits of testimony in the trial. The primary sources, 
however, are taken from the opening statement by Mr. Burck Bailey, who 
represented the State, Trial Transcript, I, pp. 26-30; the testimony of 
Mr. Dean Nourse, purchasing agent for the Oklahoma Highway Department, 
Ibid., II, pp. 152-195, III, pp. 196-202, 238-239; and Plantiff Exhibit 
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 
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invitations for bids from all who had requested to be put on the bid 
lisL These were so-called "spot bids. 11 The Highway Department called 
for f .o.b. refinery quotations on a specified quantity for a particular 
job. It was not until after Central Purchasing began procuring materials 
for the State in 1960 that the bidding procedure described in Chapter II 
came into effect. 
From 1954 until February of 1956, MC asphalt bids were always at 
8.75 cents per gallon. On a February 7, 1956 opening, the bids were 
still uniformly 8.75 cents. But two weeks later, on February 21, bids 
were opened and all suppliers had bid an identical 9.25 cents per 
gallon on MC asphalt. The price remained at that level until the 
opening of January 15, 1957. On that opening, it was found that Kerr-
rt:Gee had raised its price on MC one cent per gallon to 10.25 cents. 
On the next opening two days later, all suppliers except Anderson 
Prichard (Apco) followed suit. Apco followed one opening later on 
January 24, 1957. From that time on, with one exception, all bids 
remained identical at 10.25 cents per gallon on MC asphalt. The only 
departure from that price was in September, 1962 when Riffe lowered 
its bid to 10.20 cents a gallon from its Ardmore plant. 
Out-of-State Bids 
Rather than attempt to give a verbal accounting of out-of-state 
sales by Oklahoma asphalt suppliers, a series of tables is used to 
present that information. Table IV gives all out-of-state asphalt sales 
of 100,000 gallons or more by Kerr-McGee from its Wynnewood refinery, by 
Riffe from Ardmore, and by Apco from Arkansas City, Kansas and Cyril, 
Oklahoma for the period covering October, 1961 to October, 1965. Tables V 
through XI present data on bids from selected Oklahoma and Kansas firms. 
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TABLE IV 
ASPHALT SOLD BY KERR-McGEE, APCO, AND RIFFE OUTSIDE OKLAHOMA 
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TABLE IV (continued) 
Amount Average Price 
Sales By Destination (gallons) (cents per gallon) 
Riffe Wisconsin 16,871,713 04.752 
Riffe Arkansas 1,008,861 07.616 
Riffe Illinois 228,432 06.272 
Riffe Michigan 568,535 05.751 
Riffe New Mexico 1,609,887 05.135 
Riffe Ohio 2,584,138 05.350 
Riffe Texas 45,856,352 06.091 
Kerr-McGee Illinois 5,927,296 05. 211 
Kerr-McGee Indiana 888,484 05.159 
Kerr-McGee Kentucky 764,713 05. 155 
Kerr-McGee Michigan 114,488 06.442 
Kerr-McGee New Mexico 23,647,184 04.948 
Kerr-McGee Ohio 3,087,777 05.492 
Kerr-McGee Tennessee 508,229 06.282 
Kerr-McGee Texas 16,768,934 07.538 
Kerr-McGee Wisconsin 16,759,922 04.514 
(a) Some of the Kerr-McGee sales were made through that company 1 s 
broker, Lake Asphalt and Petroleum Company, Apco (A) denotes sales from 
Arkansas City. Apco (C) denotes sales from Cyril. 
(b) Average price in each case refers to the net back price. Net 
back refers to the delivered price less freight. 
Source: State of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials Corporation, et~., 
Plantiff Exhibit No.85. 
TABLE V 
ASPHALT BIDS TO STATE OF MINNESOTA FROM SELECTED 
REFINERIES IN KANSAS AND OKLAHOMA 
OCTOBER 1961 TO OCTOBER 1965 
Delivered 
Price Bid Freight Net Back 
Year Bidder (cents/gallon) (cents/ ga 11 on) (cents/gallon) 
BIDS TO: PIPESTONE 
1961 Kerr-McGee 10.67 04020 06A7 
1961 Mo bi 1 l 0.88 03,80 07008 
1961 Riffe 10. 96 04.20 06076 
BIDS TO: ROCHESTER 
1962 Riffe 10.88 04,04 06,84 
1962 Kerr-McGee 10,85 04.04 06.81 
1962 Mo bi 1 1o.58 03.88 06.70 
1963 Riffe 10. 04 04,04 06,00 
1963 Mobil 09.46 03,88 05.58 
BIDS TO:. AUSTIN 
1964 Riffe 09,96 03,96 06.00 
1964 Kerr-McGee l 0.88 03.96 06.92 
BIDS TO: WORTHINGTON 
1965 Riffe 10, 05 03.96 06.09 
1965 Kerr-McGee 09.97 03.96 06. 01 

















Bids taken per gallon f ,o,b. destination. All bids shown are on 
MC type. Asphalt Distances are rail miles from origin to destination. 
Source: State of Oklahoma v. Alli~ Materials Corporation, et tl·, 
Plantiff Exhibit No. 78. 
TABLE VI 
ASPHALT BIDS TO STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA FROM SELECTED 
REFINERIES IN KANSAS AND OKLAHOMA 
OCTOBER 1961 TO OCTOBER 1965 
Delivered 
Price Bid Freight Net Back 
Year Bidder (cents/gallon) (cents/ ga 11 on) (cents/gallon) 
BIDS TO: SIOUX FALLS AREA 
1962 Kerr-McGee 09.28 03.96 05.32 
1962 Skelly l 0. 02 03. 72 06.30 
1964 Riffe 09.99 04. 12 05.87 
BIDS TO: CENTERVILLE AREA 
1962 Riffe 09.54 03.96 05.58 
1964 Skelly 09,55 03. 72 05.83 
1965 Skelly 10.20 03. 72 06.48 
1965 Kerr-McGee 09.96 03.96 06.00 
1965 Riffe 10.24 03.96 06.28 
BIDS TO: CLARK AREA 
1963 Riffe 09.45 04.20 05.25 
1963 Mo bi 1 09.30 03.88 05. 15 
1963 Skelly 09.62 03.88 05.74 
1963 Kerr-McGee 09.38 04.20 05 0 18 
1964 Mo bi 1 09.76 04.04 05.72 
1964 Kerr-McGee 09.89 04.20 05.69 
BIDS TO: HOT SPRINGS AREA 
1962 Mo bi 1 08.20 04.04 04 0 16 




















Bids taken per gallon f.o.b. destination. All bids shown are on 
AC type asphalt except bids in 1965 which are on MC type asphalL 
Source: State of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials Corporation, et~., 
Plantiff Exhibit No. 79. 
TABLE VII 
ASPHALT BIDS TO STATE OF IOWA FROM SELECTED 
REFINERIES IN KANSAS AND OKLAHOMA 
OCTOBER 1961 TO OCTOBER 1965 
Delivered 
Price Bid Freight Net Back 
Year Bidder (cents/gallon) (cents/gallon) (cents/gallon) 
BIDS TO: CORYDON 
1962 Mobil 10.65 03.24 07.41 
l-962 Skelly 09.75 03.24 06.51 
1962 Derby 09.70 03.24 06.50 
1962 Cons um. Coop 11.00 03.48 07.52 
1962 Riffe 09.64 03.48 06.16 
1962 Kerr-McGee 10.49 03.48 07~01 
BIDS TO: WAUKON 
1961 Mobil 12.06 03.88 08.18 
1961 Skelly 12.00 03.88 08.12 
1961 Riffe 11.70 03.88 07.66 
1961 Kerr-McGee 11.85 04.04 07.81 
BIDS TO: SHENANDOAH 
1963 Mobil 11.49 03.00 08.49 
1963 Skelly 11.00 03.00 08.00 
1963 Consum. Coop 10.50 02.76 07.74 
1963 Riffe 11.52 03.32 08.20 
1963 Kerr-McGee 10.75 03.32 07.43 
BIDS TO: ALTOONA 
1964 Mobil 11.32 03.32 08.00 
1964 Skelly 10.82 03.32 07.50 
1964 Kerr-McGee 10.60 03.64 06.96 
1964 Riffe 10.84 03.64 07.20 
1964 Consum. Coop 11.25 03.32 07.93 
BIDS TO: KEOSAUQA 
1965 Mobil 11.51 03.56 07.95 
1965 Skelly 10.50 03.56 06.94 
1965 Consum. Coop 13.68 03.72 09.96 
1965 Riffe 11.33 03.72 07 .61 




























Bids taken per gallon f .o.b. destination. All bids shown on MC 
type asphalt. 
Source: State of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials Corporation, et!!~, 
Plantiff Exhibit No. 80. 
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TABLE VIII 
ASPHALT BIDS TO STATE OF MISSOURI FROM SELECTED 
REFINERIES IN KANSAS AND OKLAHOMA 
OCTOBER 1961 TO OCTOBER 1965 
Delivered 
Price Bid Freight Net Back 
Year Bidder (cents/gallon) (cents/gallon) (cents/gallon) 
BIDS TO: ANDREW COUNTY 
1961 Skelly 09.50 02.44 07.06 
1961 Mobil 09.68 02.44 07.22 
1961 Gen.Asp.(KM) 09.49 02.92 06.57 
1961 Riffe 09.40 02.92 06.48 
1961 Consum. Coop 09.55 02.84 06.71 
BIDS TO: BARTON COUNTY 
1962 Skelly 09.14 01.96 07 .18 
1962 Mobil 09.56 01. 96 07 .16 
1962 Kerr-McGee 09.42 02.84 06.58 
1962 Riffe 09.44 02.84 06.60 
1962 Apco 09.40 02.04 07.36 
1962 Derby 09.25 02.20 07.05 
BIDS TO: COOPER COUNTY 
1963 Skelly 10.08 02.76 07.32 
l 963 Mobil 10.17 02.76 07.41 
1963 Kerr-McGee 10.00 03.48 06.52 
BIDS TO: VERNON COUNTY 
1964 Skelly 08.90 01.72 07 .18 
1964 Mobil 09.42 01.70 07.70 
1964 Kerr-McGee 09.22 02.84 06.38 
1964 Apco 09.30 02.20 07.10 
BIDS TO: BATES COUNTY 
1965 Skelly 09.10 02.40 06. 70 . 
1965 Mobil 09.06 02.40 06.66 
1965 Kerr-McGee 09.46 02.48 06.62 
1965 Apco 09. 31 02.40 06.91 
1965 Riffe 09.70 02.40 07.30 



























Bids taken per gallon f.o.b. destination. All bids shown are on 
MC type asphalt. 
Source: State of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials Corporation, et~., 
Plantiff Exhibit No. 60. 
91 
TABLE IX 
ASPHALT BIDS TO STATE OF NEBRASKA FROM SELECTED 
REFINERIES IN KANSAS AND OKLAHOMA 
OCTOBER 1961 TO OCTOBER 1965 
Delivered 
Price Bid Freight Net Back 
Year Bidder {cents/gallon) (cents/gallon) (cents/gallon) 
BIDS TO: THAYER COUNTY 
1961 Mobil 09.60 02.44 07. 16 
1961 Gen.Asphalt 09.69 03.24 06.45 
1961 Riffe 09.63 03.24 06.39 
1961 Apco 09.73 02.44 07.29 
1961 Skelly 09.69 02.44 07.25 
BIDS TO: HALL COUNTY 
1962 Apco 09. 91 02.76 07. 15 
1962 Derby 09.81 02.76 07.05 
1962 Kerr-McGee 10.01 03.56 06.45 
1962 Mo bi 1 l 0. 05 02.76 07.29 
1962 Skelly l 0. 06 02.76 07.30 
1962 Riffe 10.47 03.56 06. 91 
BIDS TO: HOWARD COUNTY 
1963 Apco 06.00 
BIDS TO: GAGE COUNTY 
1964 Skelly 06. 15 
BIDS TO: CHASE COUNTY 


















Bids taken per gallon f.o.b. destination. All bids shown are on 
MC type asphalt except bids in 1962 which are on RC type asphalt. 
Source: State of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials Corporation, et~., 






















ASPHALT BIDS TO STATE OF WISCONSIN FROM SELECTED 
REFINERIES IN KANSAS AND OKLAHOMA 
OCTOBER 1961 TO OCTOBER 1965 
F.O.B. Refinery 






Skelly 06. 12 
Riffe 06. 10 
Skelly 05.87 
VILLAS COUNTY 
Mo bi 1 05.57 
Mobil 06.07 
COLUMBIA COUNTY 
Skelly 06. 18 
Skelly 06.58 
JEFFERSON COUNTY 



















Bids taken per gallon foo.b. destination. All bids shown are on 
MC type asphalt. 
Source: State of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials Corporation, et Al_., 
Plantiff Exhibit No.-r2. 
F "O.lL --
Bidder Refinery· 
Skelly El Dorado, Kansas 
Mobil Augusta, Kansas 
Derby Wichita, Kansas 
Riffe Sha 11 ow Water, 
Kansas 
TABLE XI 
ASPHALT BIDS TO STATE OF COLORADO FROM SELECTED 
REFINERIES IN KANSAS, 1960-1965 
Bid In Bid In Bid In Bid In 
1960 1961 1962 1963 
05,66 07.66 07.66 06.50 
07,25 07.50 07.50 07.00 
06.00 












Source: State of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials Corporation, et~., Plantiff Exhibit No. 66. 
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..i::. 
Mr. Max on the Competitiveness of Bids on Asphalt 
Received by the Oklahoma Highway Department8 
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Analyzing the exhibits concerning price and bid data on sales to 
the Oklahoma Highway Department and to other states, Mr. Max proceeded 
to fit his findings into the competitive versus non-competitive frame-
work outlined above. In bids to Northern states, Max explained that 
they showed no identity, either on a delivered price basis or on a net 
back basis. This lack of identity was both on a year to year basis by 
single suppliers, and between suppliers in a given year. He cited 
numerous examples of a firm raising or lowering its net back and 
delivered price from one year to the next in order to meet the competi-
tion. His conclusion on sales to these other states was that the price 
and bid behavior by Oklahoma (and Kansas) asphalt suppliers was 
perfectly consistent with what one would expect to find under competi-
tive conditions, It was contended that in the six Northern states of 
Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wisconsin 
"where . , . these refineries are competing one against the other, and 
against the Kansas refineries, they [Kerr-McGee, Phillips, Riffe, and 
DX] sold over 137 million gallons at an average price of 6 cents per 
gallon. 119 
Contrasting that with sales to the Oklahoma Highway Department, 
Mr. Max argued that the contrast was striking and irreconcilable in a 
competitive framework. Where bids and prices had fluctuated from year 
to year and between firms in other states, they had remained constant 
8This portion of Mr. Max's testimony appears in the Trial 
Transcript, XXIV, pp. 2585-2597 and 2604-2612. 
9Trial Transcript, XXIV, p. 2611. 
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in Oklahoma since 1957. All bids except one had been identical at 10.25 
cents per gallon. 
Max dismissed the suggestion that the lower out-of-state prices 
might have been the result of distress or dump sales by pointing to the 
quantity involved. He argued that 240 million gallons was such a large 
quantity that it could not possibly represent distress sales. 
To dispell the notion that the behavior of asphalt prices might be 
due simply to peculiarities of petroleum refined products and not due 
to lack of competition, the State presented data showing the price 
behavior of various other refinery products. Plantiff Exhibit No. 87, 
taken from Oil Daily, gives the price of MC asphalt on the first day of 
each quarter for years 1954 through 1965 and compares it with the 
corresponding price of the following products; No. 1 fuel oil, No. 2 
fuel oil, No. 6 fuel oil, kerosene, regular grade gasoline, and diesel 
fuel. Briefly summarizing that exhibit, it shows that the prices of 
the other products fluctuated over time. For MC asphalt there was no 
price flexibility; there was only one price and it did not fluctuate. 
Thus the State concluded that the behavior of Oklahoma asphalt 
suppliers was not consistent with competitive conditions. It asserted 
that the bids and prices received by the Oklahoma Highway Department 
cou1d be explained by the existence of a price fixing agreement between 
the defendants and co-conspirators. Mr. Max summarized fairly well the 
argument of the State in the following statement: 
It's inconceivable to me as an economist that under 
competitive conditions, individuals making independent 
and individual decisions would behave in a way such as 
is evidenced by the data .•. with these tremendous 
millions of gallons being sold [into] distant markets 
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at very low prices, while at the same time the price 
within the State of Oklahoma remained stable and 
identical at a high leve1,lO 
Allegation II 
General Contention 
The State's second allegation was directly related to the first. 
The State alleged that the defendants and co-conspirators in Oklahoma 
had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by agreeing to split up among 
themselves market territories and customers. It charged that this was 
accomplished by the suppliers 1 always submitting identical bids" 
Evidence and Arguments 
The State's attempt to prove its second allegation was based 
straightforwardly on the following logic: 
1) Oklahoma is a surplus asphalt producing state" 
2) Because of that fact, Oklahoma asphalt suppliers were forced 
to sell some of their product outside the State of Oklahoma. 
3) The average net back received on out-of-state sales was 
considerably lower than the price received on sales within and to the 
State of Oklahoma. 
4) By lowering its f "o.b. refinery price and absorbing some 
freight, a firm could capture a greater share of the Oklahoma market--
indeed, even the entire market--and still receive a higher price for 
its product than it was receiving out-of-state" 
lOTrial Transcript, XXIV, pp. 2611-2612" 
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5) Adoption of such a policy would be consistent with the sales 
policies which Oklahoma asphalt suppliers claimed their companies 
followed. Failure to do so would be inconsistent with their own stated 
pol i c i es. 11 
The State produced a series of exhibits in the form of maps showing 
the effect of the identical quoted prices, and the consequences of dif-
ferent price structures. Since the State of Oklahoma always buys 
asphalt so as to minimize its delivered product cost, and since all 
Lo.b. refinery price quotations were identical, then the State always 
had to purchase its asphalt from the supplier nearest the job site. 
This, of course, produced a segmented market. Each seller was guaran-
teed all sales to job locations lying on his side of points equidistant 
between his facilities and those of each of his competitors. The State 
argued that this was merely a part of the grand design of the conspira-
tors. By so allocating market territories, the conspirators could 
operate monopolistically without fear of encroachment by other 
refineries. By thus avoiding competition within the state, they could 
maintain their prices at a high and noncompetitive level. 
The State attempted to show what would have happened if the firms 
had indeed acted independently rather than acting in concert by use of 
the above-mentioned exhibits. Using the intrastate freight rates 
llsales policies of the various companies were described by a 
number of company officials including: Robert S. Ketcham, asphalt sales 
manager for Apco; Jack Mitchell, asphalt sales manager for Kerr-McGee; 
Marshall Hardy, asphalt sales manager for Sunray DX; and others. See 
Trial Transcript, XIX, p. 2067f, XXI, p. 2266f, and XXIII, p. 2408f. 
For a summary of those stated policies, see XXIV, pp. 2578-2585. In 
general, company officials indicated that they liked to sell as close 
to their plants as they could, tried to get the best and most profitable 
price they could, and tried to sell their asphalt in the best market. 
99 
established in Oklahoma by the Corporation Commission, the State 
attempted to prove that any one supplier could have captured the entire 
State of Oklahoma market and would have profited by so doing. The 
question posed by the State was in these terms: 11 How could a firm take 
the whole market knowing everyone is bidding 10.25? 11 A partial review 
of the answer to that question reveals these findings: 12 Bidding from 
its Cyril refinery, Apco could reduce its refinery price sufficient to 
overcome 160 miles of freight cost and encompass the entire market. 
Th'is means that Apco would have had to reduce its refinery price to 
7.93 cents per gallon, absorbing freight in the amount of 2,32 cents 
per gallon, Kerr-McGee, located at Cushing and Wynnewood, could over-
come its locational factor by reducing its refinery price sufficient to 
compensate for ninety miles haulage. Ninety miles freight is 1.68 cents 
per gallon. Thus with a refinery price of 8.57, Kerr-McGee could have 
captured the entire market. Sunray DX in Tulsa is located 190 miles from 
its most distant competitor, Thus by absorbing freight of 2.48 cents 
and charging a refinery price of 7.77 cents per gallon, DX could have 
encompassed the market, From Okmulgee, Phillips would have had to drop 
its price to 7.85 (allowing 2.40 cents freight for 170 miles) in order 
to take the entire market. Riffe could have taken the State by bidding 
8.17 cents from Ponca City or 8.49 cents from Ardmore. Comparing these 
possible net backs with those shown in Table IV for out-of-state sales 
would seem to make the State's proposed price reductions very attractive 
and in the best interests of the State and the price cutting firm. It 
12rhe above question and the following responses are taken from the 
State's questioning of Mr, Dean Nourse, Trial Transcript, II, pp, 211-
224, Supporting exhibits are Plantiff Exhibits Nos. 43-47. 
should be emphasized, however, that such conclusions are based on a 




The State 1 s third allegation that asphalt suppliers in Oklahoma and 
Kansas agreed among themselves not to market in each other 1 s states was 
built around the almost complete absence of shipments between the two 
states. Since the State was only interested in establishing damages to 
the State of Oklahoma, major emphasis was placed on the lack of bids by 
Kansas refineries into Oklahoma. The State's primary strategy was to 
show that such behavior by Kansas firms could logically be explained 
only in the context of an interstate conspiracy. It did note, however, 
that Oklahoma refineries virtually never sold into Kansas (and never to 
the State of Kansas), but sold nearly to the Canadian border. The 
failure of Oklahoma firms to bid into Kansas, it was contended, could 
only be explained as reciprocal to the Kansas firms' actions. 
Evidence and Arguments 
Much of the evidence used by the State in its attempt to prove the 
existence of a conspiracy between Oklahoma and Kansas refineries is 
contained above in Tables IV through XI. These bids and sales of Kansas 
refineries were analyzed in light of the close proximity of several of 
the refineries to the Oklahoma market. Reviewing briefly, it will be 
recalled that Apco operates an asphalt producing refinery in Arkansas 
City, just six miles north of the Oklahoma-Kansas line. Mobil operates 
a plant at Augusta, some 45 miles above the Oklahoma border, which 
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annually produces around 80 million gallons of asphalt. And Skelly 
operates an asphalt producing refinery in El Dorado, 65 miles away from 
Oklahoma. Not one of these refineries--or any other Kansas refinery--
ever submitted a bid or sold asphalt to the State of Oklahoma. All 
during the period covered by the suit, MC type asphalt was selling at 
10.25 cents per gallon in Oklahoma. 
A brief examination of some of the figures shown by the exhibits 
will make the thrust of the State's argument quite clear. Plantiff 
Exhibit No. 85 reveals such sales as nearly half a million gallons of 
asphalt being sold by Apco from Arkansas City into Minnesota at an 
average net back of 5.463 cents per gallon. From the same plant Apco 
sold some six and a quarter million gallons of asphalt into Iowa at an 
average net back of 8.166 cents. During the same period of time, Apco 
sold no asphalt into Oklahoma, just six miles away. Plantiff Exhibit 
No. 79 reveals bids by Mobil reaching into the southwestern part of 
South Dakota, over 700 miles from its Augusta refinery. A 1965 bid by 
Mobil into that area carried a delivered price of 9,04 cents and a net 
back of only 4.84 cents per gallon. The same exhibit shows numerous 
bids by Skelly into South Dakota. For example, Skelly bids to 
Centerville, 491 miles from El Dorado, in 1964 and 1965 carried 
delivered prices of 9.55 and 10.20 cents with net backs of 5.83 and 
6.48 cents per gallon. 13 Plantiff Exhibit No. 72 shows Skelly bidding 
into northern Wisconsin, some 785 miles away from El Dorado. Skelly 
bids into Ashland County in 1964 and 1965 show net backs of only 6.12 
and 5.87 cents per gallon. The exhibit also reveals instances of Mobil 
13The 1964 bid of 9.55 cents was on AC type asphalt which was 
selling for 9.75 cents in Oklahoma at the time. 
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bidding as far as 860 miles from Augusta at net backs of 5.57 and 6.07 
cents. And as the State continually reminded the jury, while submitting 
bids and selling asphalt at very low prices into these distant markets, 
Apco, Mobil, and Skelly submitted no bids and sold no asphalt to 
Oklahoma, just 6, 45, and 65 miles away, respectively. 
Another exhibit which the State emphasized heavily was Plantiff 
Exhibit No. 66, showing bids into Colorado. The State considered this 
exhibit particularly important because of the fact that the State of 
Colorado took bids in the same manner as the State of Oklahoma--f .o.b. 
refinery. That exhibit shows bids by Mobil, situated 295 miles from 
the Colorado border, quoting f .o.b. refinery prices ranging from a low 
of 6.45 cents to a high of 7.50 cents per gallon on MC type asphalt. 
Skelly, even further away from Colorado, submitted bids ranging as low 
as 5.66 cents to a high of 7.66 cents. Once again, these bids were 
during the years 1960 to 1965, when the f.o.b. refinery price in 
Oklahoma was a constant 10.25 cents. Such action, the State argued, 
simply was not compatible with free and open competitive conditions. 
For, as the State showed, Oklahoma's southernmost refineries lay nearer 
El Dorado, Augusta, and Arkansas City than did the Colorado market. 
Thus, the State suggested, if Skelly, Mobil and Apco had submitted bids 
of 6 or 8 cents per gallon to the State of Oklahoma, they could have 
sold significant amounts in that market with better net backs than they 
were receiving in Colorado and the northern states. 14 
14Trial Transcript, I, pp. 38-39; XLII, p. 4677, Threads of this 
contention may be found throughout the State's presentation of its case. 
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The State went on to point out that Oklahoma asphalt suppliers 
never submitted bids to the State of Kansas. Once again, the previously 
mentioned exhibits were used to show bids by Oklahoma firms into Iowa, 
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Missouri, and various other states. 
Why, the State asked, would Oklahoma firms "leap-frog" Kansas while 
absorbing freight of more than four cents in instances to bid into the 
northern states? Its answer, of course, was a collusive agreement among 
the conspirators. 
To be completely accurate, it should be noted that there were minor 
·instances of asphalt shipments crossing the Oklahoma-Kansas line going 
each direction. The record does show some sales by Oklahoma refineries 
into the State of Kansas. For example, Phillips shipped some small 
quantities of asphalt into Kansas from Okmulgee. For the most part, 
however, these were "specialty" products, such as emulsified asphalts. 
As for the size of the shipments, they were quite small, amounting to 
only 47,000 gallons in 1963, 42,000 gallons in 1964, and 104,000 gallons 
in 19650 Phillips also shipped 76,000 gallons of MC into Kansas in 
1963. But none of these shipments by Phillips represented sales to the 
state of Kansaso All sales were to a broker. Aside from the Phillips 
sales, there were a few Oklahoma-to-Kansas sales made by Riffe. But, 
once again, such sales were rare and involved very small quantitieso A 
quick review of the record of Kansas-to-Oklahoma sales reveals a similar 
pattern of small and ·infrequent shipments. For example, several 
defendants 1 exhibits, Nos. R95-R99, show sales from Shallow Water into 
the Oklahoma panhandleo The quantities once again are small; 6,180 
gallons of MC-1, 6309 gallons of MC-1, 5452 gallons of RC-2, 13,880 
gallons of AC-5, 5,401 gallons of RC-4o None of these sales into 
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Oklahoma was to the State of Oklahoma. Thus, the State 1 s contention 
that Oklahoma refineries did not bid or sell to the State of Kansas and 
that Kansas refineries neither submitted bids nor sold to the State of 
Oklahoma remains intact.15 
As a concluding point to show that nothing except a collusive 
agreement kept Kansas firms from bidding into the higher priced Oklahoma 
market, the State pointed out that since its filing of the suit, in just 
two years the Kansas refineries had sold just less than five million 
gallons into Oklahoma.1 6 This, the State argued, demonstrated that the 
only barrier preventing Kansas firms from selling into Oklahoma all 
along had been the existence of a collusive, market allocating agreement 
between refineries in the two states. 
Allegation IV 
The State 1 s fourth allegation that the defendants and 
co-conspirators conspired to monopolize the sale of asphalt in the 
State of Oklahoma is simply a logical outgrowth from the other charges. 
To the extent that the State proved the first three charges, it also 
provided support for this last allegation. Thus, it is not necessary 
to present a detailed discussion of new evidence and arguments in this 
section. 
The basic points in the State 1s argument of this allegation are: 
1) Until the suit was filed, no one from outside Oklahoma ever 
sold asphalt to the State. 
15see Tr1'al Transcr1'pt, II p 143 XLIV p 4737 f , • , , • or a more 
complete discussion of sales between the two states. 
16Trial Transcript, XLIV, p. 4765. 
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2) With a single exception, no one outside the State of Oklahoma 
ever sold asphalt to a contractor within the State of Oklahoma. 
3) No one but Oklahoma asphalt suppliers were ever members of the 
Asphalt Refiners Association. 
4) Only members of the Asphalt Refiners Association ever sold 
asphalt to the State of Oklahoma. 
5) These facts, along with the evidence and arguments presented 
relative to the other allegations make it clear that 11 the defendants 
and co-conspirators had the power and the intent to exclude competition 
from Oklahoma and that they exercised that power. 1117 
Additional Material Presented by the State 
Certain of the arguments presented by the State cannot readily be 
classified as support for any particular allegation but, nevertheless, 
constitute an important part of the plantiff's case. In general, these 
arguments were aimed at convincing the jury of the plausibility, indeed 
the probability, that a conspiratorial agreement existed between the 
respondents. 
The first step for the State was to plant in the minds of the 
jurors the notion that businessmen do at times fail to conduct them-
selves in the best interest of the public. Proceeding along this line, 
the State made much of the well known maxim of Adam Smith: 
17rrial Transcript, I, p. 41. 
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even 
for merriment and diversion, but the conversation 
ends in a conspiracy against the public or in some 
contrivance to raise prices.18 
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Having laid this foundation, the next step was to establish that 
Oklahoma asphalt suppliers were members of a market structure particu-
larly susceptible to such conspiracies and contrivances. Here the State 
merely established that the sale of liquid asphalt to the Oklahoma 
Highway Department would fall into the category of oligopoly. That 
being done, there was no shortage of statements by well-known economists 
to the effect that oligopoly invites collusion. Thus the jury was 
bombarded with such statements from numerous sources--even one from a 
text written by one of the defendants• own expert witnesses. Next it 
was contended by the State that collusive agreements are easier to 
enforce closer to home. 19 
Once the jury had been properly informed that (a) when businessmen 
get together, even for a friendly game of golf, it frequently results in 
a conspiracy to fix prices; (b) Oklahoma asphalt suppliers are oligopo-
lists, and oligopolists are the worst group about conspiring; and 
(3) conspiracies close to home (within the State boundaries?) are the 
easiest to enforce, the next step was to prove that the parties had 
indeed met together--before each contract letting, in fact. The 
meetings of the Asphalt Refiners Association in its Oklahoma City 
18Trial Transcript, XLIC, p. 4788. The source of the quote is, of 
course, Smith's Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan (New York, 1937), 
Book I, Chapter X, Part-YI. 
19Trial Transcript, XLIII, p. 4614. 
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headquarters have already been mentioned. One particular meeting 
however--held at the Trade Winds Motel in Tulsa in February, 1962--was 
given special attention. Present at this meeting were representatives 
of each of the respondents. In most cases the representative was in 
charge of asphalt sales for his company. The State presented one 
witness, who had been present at the meeting, whose testimony hinted 
that an upcoming State contract letting was discussed at the meeting. 
The witness intimated that he had overheard some incriminating conversa-
tion at the time. According to this witness, he had heard one of the 
defendants state that: 
We have a nice little closed deal going down there 
[Oklahoma], and we get good prices. And we have the 
same thing ~B in Montana and roughly, the same thing 
up in Utah. 
20Trial Transcript, XXIV, p. 2490. The witness was asphalt sales 
manager for Union Asphalt and Road Oils, Inc. at the time of the 1962 
meeting. The actual importance of this particular witness in the case 
is extremely difficult to assess or explain. Apparently his role was 
primarily to plant suspicion in the minds of the jurors concerning the 
propriety of the defendants' actions. This was done largely through 
innuendo. He did not present direct testimony and evidence that the 
defendants actually rigged prices at the Trade Winds meeting. The 
reason that he played this limited role seems to have been that the man 
was not unimpeachable, and the State was most hesitant to rely heavily 
on his testimony. Actually, several persons who were knowledgeable of 
the case intimated to this writer that the witness was not the strong, 
unimpeachable witness that the State would have liked to have had giving 
direct testimony of a conspiratorial meeting. (None of these persons 
consented to be quoted and identified. Nor were all the reasons for the 
witness 1 s vulnerability spelled out.) The fact that the State placed 
major emphasis on proving the conspiracy by economic argument and relied 
very little on the testimony of this witness adds credibility to the 
suggestion that the witness's testimony and/or character was not 
indisputable. 
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Concluding Remarks on the State's Case 
The State's case follows rather well the second approach mentioned 
by A. D. Neale. The State started with the absence of price competition 
and sought to show that that state of affairs could not have been 
maintained without collusion. Further, the State did use {as Neale 
suggested it should be) the uniformity of prices among ostensible 
competitors as only a starting point. It proceeded to establish a whole 
pattern of performance which it alleged could result only from collusive 
conduct. The higher level of bids to the State of Oklahoma, the 
geographically segmented market, the absence of cross-bidding between 
Kansas and Oklahoma state lines, the competitiveness of bids to the 
northern states--all these were described as pieces of a collusive 
puzzle. The piece holding the puzzle together was the Asphalt Refiners 
Association, the alleged mechanism for implementing the illegal 
conspiracy. 
Obviously the treatment of the State's case is only an outline of 
the actual case. It would be impossible to record every' fact, every 
exhibit, every argument of a case which generated some 5000 pages of 
trial transcript. The effort has been to present a fair representation 
of the Stateus case; to present enough of the State's arguments and 
evidence to acquaint the reader with the direction and main thrust of 
the State 1 s case. 
Nonconspiratorial Explanation of Respondents' 
Pricing and Sales Policies 
Having examined the State's case contending that the behavior of 
the respondents could logically be explained only in the context of an 
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illegal conspiratorial agreement, the next step is to ask whether an 
alternative explanation is possible. The approach is to attempt to 
rebut the State 1 s explanation and to offer a logical, nonconspiratorial 
explanation of the respondents' behavior. Since the rebuttals of 
certain of the State's charges are inseparably related (eg., identical 
bids and a geographically segmented market both result from one factor, 
that being the respondent's pricing policy), the format here is to deal 
with each allegation as it logically arises. Thus the rebuttals do not 
necessarily fol1ow the same sequence as in the above section. 
Allegations I and II Revisited 
The State's development of its first two allegations logically 
falls into two major parts. First is the trade association--the 
alleged vehicle of the conspiracy. Next is the alleged noncompetitive 
characteristics exhibited by the respondents' market performance. 
Identical bids and price changes, the geographically segmented market, 
and the high level of in-state relative to out-of-state bids were all 
viewed by the State as supportive of its allegation of noncompetitive 
pricing to the Oklahoma Highway Department. 
1. Asphalt Refiners Association. First it must be recalled that 
the law does not forbid competitors to meet together. There is nothing 
illegal per se about a trade association. This point was made in 
Chapter II at which time it was noted that a trade association may 
legally carry out certain functions. 21 On the other hand, competitors 
may not "agree upon the prices at which they collectively will buy, or 
2lsee page 15 of this paper. 
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sell, the territory in which they will do business, or the persons with 
whom each will deai. 22 
Thus in the absence of proof that the meetings of the Asphalt 
Refiners Association were for the purposes of discussing forbidden 
rather than legal topics, the State's contentions concerning that group 
could be considered as no more than an attempt to plant seeds of 
suspicion in the minds of the jurors. 
2, Noncompetitive characteristics of bids to Oklahoma Highway 
Department. Is it possible that the identity of bids to the State, 
their relatively high level, and other apparent noncompetitive 
behavioral patterns can be logically explained in the absence of a 
conspiracy? The defense answered that question affirmatively, First 
it should be pointed out that these were hardly "secret, sealed bids 11 
which asphalt suppliers submitted, Instead, the companies followed the 
practice of simply quoting their dock prices to the State Highway 
Department. That dock price was known to all producers in the industry--
being listed in leading trade publications such as Oil Daily and Platt 1 s 
Oilgram. Thus the State 1 s claim that the suppliers ''submitted literally 
hundreds of secret, sealed bids on asphalt to the State of Oklahoma, 
which were identical to the fourth decimal point" loses much of its bite, 
It might also be noted that "identical to the fourth decimal point" 
sounds much more sinister than was the actual quoting procedure. Since 
the published price of asphalt is expressed as dollars per gallon, the 
fourth decimal point turns out to be merely the per gallon price to the 
22van Cise, p. 33, Once again, see Van Cise for citations of the 
cases from which each of these decisions is taken. 
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quarter of a cent; eg., 0.1025 is simply ten and a quarter cents per 
gallon. 
The question of why the suppliers would make a practice of quoting 
dock price was addressed in Chaptet III but deserves a brief review 
here. First it will be recalled that the State did not specify quanti-
ties to be purchased or time of delivery on its contracts. It only 
agreed to purchase 11 quantities needed and designated." Recall also 
that prices quoted by the supplier took the form of price guarantees on 
the unknown quantities. Prices were quoted f .o.b. refinery and trans-
portation costs are significant. There was no possibility of secret 
price concessions on a State contract because of the State practice of 
notifying all bidders of the winning bid and bidder. Under these 
circumstances, it would seem illogical for the suppliers to adopt any 
other pricing policy toward the State. Thus the identity of bids and 
the rigid adherence to the dock prices should be expected to obtain 
under the State 1 s purchase procedure, conspiracy or no conspiracy. The 
occasional departures from that rule may be viewed as feelers by 
particular companies to see if other companies would follow. The 
January 15, 1957 price hike by Kerr-McGee and the subsequent response 
by other suppliers could be cited as an example. 
And what about the geographically segmented market? Once again, 
the answer to that should be clear from Chapter III. It was the direct 
result of the suppliers• adherence to dock prices. Each supplier had 
a geographic a~ea in which he had a freight favored status. And why 
would a supplier not expand his market by freight absorption? Why 
sell out-of-state at a low net back when the supplier could absorb a 
few cents freight and capture the entire market as the State suggested? 
112 
That too should be obvious from the analysis in Chapter III, but the 
issue deserves some amplification here. It will be recalled that the 
State contended that Riffe could have captured the entire Oklahoma 
Highway Department market with an 8.49 cent bid from Ardmore. This bid 
would have yielded a considerably higher net back than Riffe received 
on most out-of-state sales. With regard to that contention, Mr. Ray 
Felts of Riffe echoed, in his own words, what was explained in Chapter 
III above. First he indicated that such a policy would involve 11 lower-
ing the price in a place where we were already low. 1123 (It will be 
recalled that geographic price discrimination within this market is 
impossible,) Next Felts noted that if they were to 11 lower our price 
1.5 cents to match someone, they merely lower five points and stay in 
there. 1124 Other asphalt sales executives offered similar conslusions. 
And when asked if he could capture the entire State of Oklahoma market 
for six months with a price reduction, L. E. Riffe replied, 11 No. The 
State had the right to change it within twenty-four hours and ask for 
bids from all my competitors that would equal or be less than mine. 1125 
Thus, given the State 1 s bidding procedure, one must admit that no 
supplier has an overwhelming incentive to quote less than his dock 
price to the Oklahoma Highway Department. Actually it seems ironic 
that a system which the State devised apparently in hopes of obtaining 
lower prices may have had the opposite effect. 
23Trial Transcript, XXXIII, p. 3605. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., XXXV, p. 3740. 
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And finally, what about the level of in-state relative to out-of-
state bids? As was explained in the section concerning Intermarket 
Sales Policies, one would logically expect asphalt suppliers naturally 
to precipitate toward discriminatory pricing. Given the different 
elasticities of demand in the various markets, price discrimination 
seems the only logical course of action for the respondents. Thus the 
lower elasticity coefficient of the Oklahoma Highway Department provides 
the best explanation of the relatively higher prices charged in that 
market, 
Along the same line, it might also be recalled that Oklahoma 
asphalt suppliers face a much more competitive situation in the case 
of the out-of-state market. Oklahoma suppliers, being from a surplus 
asphalt producing state, must compete with other surplus-state suppliers 
for the markets in deficit states. More is made of this point below in 
discussing the State's third allegation. 
The defense raised two additional arguments to help explain the 
discrepancy between in-state and out-of-state prices. First, sales 
to the Oklahoma Highway Department always involved hot asphalt. Asphalt 
sent to the northern states was usually sent by tank car and not hot. 
Thus the lower price charged the northern states could be due partially 
to the fact that cold asphalt is worth less than hot asphalt. 26 A 
second question deals with the appropriate price to use. The State 
argued that the net back price was the appropriate price to use in 
analyzing price differentials between the markets. The defense, on the 
26The defense did not fully develop and utilize this argument, 
however. They did not give data concerning heating costs and attempt 
to make price adjustments to allow for this factor. 
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other hand, argued that the delivered price was the relevant one. 
Obviously the State would choose the price which maximizes the differen-
tial and the defense would desire to minimize it. While a full 
discussion of this issue is beyond the realm of this study, the 
following observations are offered. Market performance cannot be 
assessed solely on the basis of delivered price. Looking only at 
delivered price could lead to the conclusion that a basing point system 
such as 11 Pittsburgh-Plus 11 was the epitome of competitive pricing. On 
the other hand, neither does it seem proper to totally ignore legiti-
mate transportation costs. But the question of which price is the 
legitimate one is relevant only to the size of--not the existence of--
a price differential. And the defendants never denied the existence 
of price discrimination. Oklahoma asphalt producers face considerably 
more competition in the northern markets than in Oklahoma. Being 
nearer the competitive end of the spectrum, price in the northern 
market is closer to being a given so far as Oklahoma suppliers are 
concerned. They are in no position to administer prices in those 
markets; they must meet the competition. Having no control over the 
transport costs, they must lower the refinery price. 
Allegation III Answered 
The State 1 s contention that Kansas and Oklahoma asphalt suppliers 
had an agreement not to bid into each others' state was built rather 
straightforwardly on (l) the lack of such bidding between the two states, 
and (2) bids by suppliers from both states to other, more distant 
markets. 
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Here too, it hardly seems farfetched to argue that such a practice 
could evolve in the absence of a collusive agreement. Both Kansas and 
Oklahoma are surplus asphalt producing states. Suppliers in each state 
knew that they must dispose of large quantities of asphalt out-of-state. 
The only question was where. Not surprisingly, both Kansas and Oklahoma 
suppliers turned to deficit states as markets for their surplus; thus 
the bids into states such as Nebraska, Missouri, Wisconsin, and the 
other northern states. It is true that Kansas and Oklahoma suppliers 
could have bid into each others' states, but such hardly seems in 
keeping with their own best interests. Because of transportation costs 
Oklahoma suppliers have a competitive advantage in Oklahoma. The same 
holds for Kansas suppliers in Kansas. It is undoubtedly true that Apco, 
Skelly, and/or Mobil could have lowered their prices and made some 
successful bids into Oklahoma. But Oklahoma firms would have retaliated 
and the net result would have likely been little or no increase in sales, 
but everyone would be receiving lower prices on all asphalt sold. So 
why risk a price war when the firms could compete on fairly even terms 
in the northern states? 
Here is where freight rates come into the picture. Interstate 
freight rates are so constructed as to put Kansas and Oklahoma suppliers 
on roughly equal terms in the northern markets. Consider, for example, 
the case of shipments of suppliers from Kansas and Oklahoma to Omaha. 27 
The rate from the Oklahoma area is 3.79, or three and seventy-nine 
hundredths cents per gallon to Omaha. This is a common rate for all 
27This example is taken from 1the testimony of Richard H. Leftwich, 
Standard Industries, Inc., and Metropolitan Paving Co., Inc. v. Skelly 
Oil Co., et~., Trial Transcript, XXIV, pp. 4596-4597. 
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Oklahoma suppliers. From El Dorado, the common point in Kansas, the 
rate is 3.62. Thus the asphalt would arrive at the dispersal rail point 
at only 17/lOOths of a cent difference in costs. This would allow 
Oklahoma firms to be quite competitive with Kansas firms in the northern 
markets. 
Another point which must be discussed relative to the State's 
third allegation deals with between-state bids coming after the date of 
the filing of the suit. The State argued that while there was no 
between-state bidding during the alleged conspiracy era, after 
October 4, 1965, Kansas refineries began to sell into Oklahoma. This, 
the State contended, clearly demonstrated that only an illegal market 
allocating agreement could have prevented such a practice in the past. 
What the State failed to mention was that it had made several changes 
in its bidding procedure. As was mentioned above, the State had always 
required bidders to have testing laboratories and to meet other require-
ments before it would accept bids. For example, Inland submitted a bid 
from a new refinery in March, 1962. It was not until November that 
Inland was finally notified of acceptance. 28 This State practice tended 
to exclude, or at least discourage, out-of-state bidders. In fact, the 
State did not invite out-of-state suppliers to bid until after the 
filing of the suit. But after the filing of the suit the State sent 
out bid invitations to twenty-two out-of-state suppliers. At the same 
time (March 28, 1966) the State dropped its prior inspection 
requirement. 29 Additionally, the State revamped its bidding procedure 
28Trial Transcript, I, p. 91. 
29Ibid., pp. 113-117. 
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in several other respects after October, 1965. On October 14, 1965, 
the provision awarding a contract to all qualified bidders was dropped. 
At the same time bids were put on a per ton basis, and if a bidder was 
unable to make delivery, the State would go to the next highest bidder. 
In April, 1966, the State started taking spot bids. Suppliers were 
asked as often as one or more times a week to bid on a specified amount 
for each particular job. Thus the State's pointing to bids made after 
the filing of the suit as support for its third allegation hardly seems 
legitimate. 
It further seems that if the absence of between-state bids was 
cited as evidence of illegality, the suppliers would almost automati-
cally begin to submit such bids once they learned of the charges. One 
might even expect a natural human tendency to overreact in such a 
situation. For example, there is some evidence of a similar over-
reaction on the part of electrical equipment producers in the now-
famous electrical conspiracy of the early 1960 1 s. Soon after successful 
prosecution seemed assured, prices of some electrical products were 
reduced drastically. But they did not remain at that low level--they 
subsequently rose to an intermediate level. There is some reason to 
believe that at least part of the explanation for the huge initial price 
drop lies in this overreaction factor. 30 Thus it seems justifiable to 
discount the value of the State's arguments concerning the respondents• 
behavioral changes immediately following the filing of charges. 
30Ronald H. Wolf reports that some prices dropped as much as 30, 
40, and even 50 per cent. See his "Identical Pricing and TVA: Toward 
More Effective Competition," The Economic Impact of TVA, ed. John R. 
Moore (Knoxville, 1967}, p. 93. 
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Re: Allegation IV 
If the State's proof of its first three allegations logically 
substantiated its fourth allegation, then the successful rebuttal of 
those same allegations must rebut the State's monopolization charge. 
Thus what the State called a conspiracy "to monopolize the sale of 
asphalt within and to the State of Oklahoma" could be dismissed as 
being instead informed, independent action on the part of liquid asphalt 
suppliers. 
Consideration of Hypotheses 
Before attempting to pass judgment on the validity of the two 
hypotheses, a few words of caution appear in order. First, in tenta-
tively confirming or rejecting any hypothesis, one does "pass judgment." 
It is important to recognize that in drawing conclusions regarding the 
testing of~ hypothesis, value judgment is involved. Friedman's well-
known caution is worth repeating. "Factual evidence can never 'prove' 
a hypothesis; it can only fail to disprove it, which is what is 
generally meant when we say, somewhat inexactly, that the hypothesis 
has been 1 confirmed 1 by experience. 11 31 
One other statement of Friedman's seems quite apropos. 
"Unfortunately, we can seldom test particular predictions in the social 
sciences by experiments explicitly designed to eliminate what are 
judged to be the most important disturbing influences. Generally, we 
31 Milton Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics," Essays 
in Positive Economics (Chicago, 1953), p. 9. 
must rely on evidence cast up by the 'experiments' that hap.pen to 
occur .... No experiment can be completely controlled 
Keeping in mind these limitations, consider the two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis I 
Restatement of Hypothesis: Because of some special market 
conditions peculiar to the liquid asphalt industry, firms in that 
industry are particularly susceptible to antitrust involvement. 
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One of the major conclusions resulting from the foregoing analysis 
has to be that the same pricing and sales policies should be expected 
from Oklahoma asphalt suppliers whether their conduct was collusive or 
noncollusive. Market conditions are such that the same performance 
could result from two widely divergent conduct alternatives. If this 
conclusion is accurate, a major step has been taken toward confirming 
Hypothesis I, It will be recalled that the identity of bids submitted 
by asphalt suppliers seems to have been a prime factor behind the State's 
decision to file charges. Indeed, there is substantial evidence to 
suggest that identical bidding is widely considered as prima facie 
evidence of conspiracy. The pervasiveness of that view was evidenced 
by former President Kennedy's issuance of Executive Order 10936. That 
order requires all government departments to report to the Attorney 
General any instances of identical bids on government purchases or 
sales which exceed $10,000. (The figure of $10,000 may be raised or 
lowered at the discretion of the Attorney General.) Some of the wording 
of that order is particularly interesting. 
32 Ibid,, p, 10. 
Whereas it is in the interest of the United States to 
obtain truly competitive bids in connection with its pro-
curement and sale of property and services pursuant to 
public invitations for bids and the prevalence of identical 
· bidding is harmful to the effective functioning of a system 
of competitive bids; 
Whereas identical bidding may constitute evidence of 
the existence of conspiracies to monopolize or restrain 
trade or commerce; and 
Whereas the collection and dissemination of information 
with regard to identical bids submitted to the Federal 
government will discourage future submissions of such bids, 
aid in the enforcement of the antitrust laws and the mainte-
nance of a competitive economy and serve to reduce the costs 
of the Government . o • • 
.. , The principal purpose of this order is to make more 
effective the enforcement of the antitrust laws by insuring 
that the Attorney General has at his disposal all informa-
tion which may tend to establish the presence of a 
conspiracy in restraint of trade and which may warrant 
further investigation with a view to preferring civil or 
criminal charges.33 
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Earl W. Kintner reports that there is a growing tendency for state and 
local authorities to file with the Department of Justice or the Federal 
Trade Commission, or both, information on identical bids on public 
purchases or contracts. This trend, he predicts, will become increas-
ingly widespread.34 Even some academic economists are apparently willing 
to equate identical bidding and conspiracy. It seems clear that 
Professor Vernon Mund would be willing to initiate proceedings in any 
case involving identical bidding. He recommends that 11 the legal 
doctrine that identical bidding is consistent with effective competition 
33Executive Order 10936, issued April 24, 1961, seems to have been 
a direct consequence of the great electrical conspiracy. Wolf apparently 
finds this issue very intriguing. He carefully traces the link between 
the TVA 1 s disclosure of identical bidding, the detection of the 
electrical conspiracy, and the resulting impact on public policy. 
34Earl W. Kintner, An Antitrust Primer (New York, 1964), p. 37. 
121 
should be replaced with a working rule making identical bidding a 
presumption of illegal conduct lessening competition and restraining 
trade. 1135 
In light of such evidence, it appears that firms in any industry 
which is characterized by a history of identical bidding on public 
contracts will sooner or later find themselves facing antitrust litiga-
tion. This seems especially true when the identical bidding occurs in 
an industry which also exhibits other traits which might lend support 
to an initial suspicion raised by the identical bidding. Good examples 
of such traits might be the existence of intermarket price differentials, 
and/or the absence of cross-bidding between suppliers in two different 
markets (such as Oklahoma suppliers not bidding into Kansas, and Kansas 
suppliers not bidding into Oklahoma). Add to all this the successful 
prosecution of firms in the same industry in a neighboring state and a 
trip to the court on conspiracy charges is practically assured. Thus 
it must be concluded that the first hypothesis is confirrned--or rather 
that it was not disproved. 
Hypothesis II 
Restatement of Hypothesis: Because of these same market conditions, 
an asphalt supplier may well be found guilty of an antitrust violation 
when in fact the firm's conduct conforms to that which could be 
expected of an independently-acting, profit-maximizing firm. 
35vernon A. Mund, "Identical Bid Prices," Journal of Political 
Economy, LXVIII (April, 1960), pp. 168-169. 
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On the basis of economic analysis of the industry, some inferences 
may be offered as to the characteristics which should be expected in the 
market performance of Oklahoma liquid asphalt suppliers. To be expected 
are: 
1) The submission of identical price quotations to the State of 
Oklahoma; 
2) The presence of price discrimination between various markets 
on the basis of differing elasticities of demand; and 
3) The marketing of surplus asphalt into deficit, rather than 
into other surplus asphalt producing states. 
One should expect to find these factors, conspiracy or no conspiracyo 
It must then be concluded that from an examination of the economic 
performance exhibited by Oklahoma liquid asphalt suppliers, there is 
no sound basis in economic theory for inferring that it resulted from 
one mode of conduct rather than from another. By simply looking at the 
performance of Oklahoma asphalt suppliers, it is impossible to make 
a strong economic case that the contributing market conduct was either 
conspiratorial or nonconspiratorialo 
At this point it must be explained that the legal requirements for 
conviction differ between criminal and civil cases. Under the law, in 
criminal cases the state must prove guilt beyond any reasonable doubt. 
In civil actions, a case must be substantiated by a preponderance of 
evidence, This is a significant difference. In criminal proceedings, 
as Lewis Mayers explains, 
The rule is simply that the defendant is not to be 
convicted merely because the evidence against him 
outweighs that in his favor; the evidence of guilt 
must so far outweigh the evidence of his innoc§Bce 
that no reasonable doubt of his guilt remains. 
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But in civil cases (such as the one presently under consideration), a 
preponderance of the evidence will suffice. This simply means that one 
side must have the 11 greater weight of evidence. 11 37 Thus one party must 
simply tip the balance of evidence in his favor. 
Where does this leave us relative to Hypothesis II? Recall first 
that the case, entitled State of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials 
Corporation, et~., was tried before a jury composed of citizens 
(and taxpayers) of the State of Oklahoma. It was a case in which a 
mere preponderance of the evidence was sufficient for finding for 
either side. Next consider the economic evidence presented in the 
trial. As has been shown, a sound economic case can be made for either 
a conspiratorial or a nonconspiratorial explanation of the conduct of 
the defendants. Which explanation is a jury most likely to accept? 
There is a deep-seated suspicion in America that conspiracy 
is everywhere afoot. Television programs are awful because 
1 they 1 want them that way. Stocks go up or down because 
1 insiders 1 are rigging the market. Rents are high because 
the landlords are ganging up on the rest of us. The Yankees 
always won because that's how 'they' wanted it; now 1 they 1 
don't want it that way any more, so the Yankees lose. The 
Establishment thinks the campus disruptions are manipulated 
by a few hardcore conspirators (two SOS members, a Black 
Panther, a Soviet attache, and a professor); and militants 
think the military-industrial complex (in the person of a 
general, two corporation presidents, a United States Senator, 
and a professor) is plotting behind closed doors to manipu-
late everybody else. We've all seen too many Westerns, So 
why should interest rates be any different?38 
36Lewis Mayers, The American Legal System (New York, 1955), p. 110. 
37Henry C, Black, Black's Law Dictionary (St. Paul, 1968), p, 1344. 
38Lawrence S. Ritter and William L. Silber, Money (New York, 1970), 
pp. 93-94. 
If one takes Ritter and Silber 1 s rather humorous observation and 
substitutes the words 11 liquid asphalt prices 11 for 11 interest rates 11 
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in the last sentence, he is confronted with a serious and important 
question, While the Ritter-Silber quotation does not prove that a jury 
will always accept a conspiratorial explanation, it may point to a 
problem faced by the defense. Economic theory alone does not seem to 
provide a clear and self-evident answer as to the conduct of the 
defendants. It is also possible that a jury might be composed of 
twelve ordinary men and women who do not happen to be especially 
knowledgeable of sophisticated economic theories. If the jury is then 
unable to infer conduct on the basis of pure economic theory, upon what 
might it base its decision? If the jury knows that the defendants made 
a practice of meeting together just prior to each bid letting, might 
not that fact be weighed heavily? It might also be very damaging to 
the defendants if the State could present a witness--any type witness 
would do--to suggest that the defendants were less than honorable men; 
that they even met together in a motel on occasion. Add to that the 
fact that even the Father of Economics has said that 11 People of the 
same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but 
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or in some 
contrivance to raise prices, 11 and a conspiratorial explanation might be 
very appealing, 
The judgment handed down by the jury against the defendants in 
State of Oklahoma v, Allied Materials Corporation, et.!]_. suggests that 
a firm may be convicted on an antitrust violation even when a strong 
economic case can be made that its conduct is consistent with that which 
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could be expected of an independently-acting, profit-maximizing firm. 
It also seems to confirm Hypothesis II. 
CHAPTER V 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
National Policy Considerations 
The significance of the case, State of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials 
Corporation, et .!l_., extends far beyond the confines of its effect on 
the parties involved. At the heart of the case lies an extremely 
important question. It is a question which has arisen in antitrust 
cases before, but is one which is as yet unresolved. That question is: 
To what degree should the courts regard parallel action as proof of 
illegal collusion without explicit proof of the coordinating mechanism? 
The way in which this issue is ultimately resolved may have a signifi-
cant impact on antitrust policy, and possibly even on the structure of 
American industry. The implication of answering that question in one 
way--and the courts have on occasion approached that way--is an 
outlawing of those types of oligopolistic structures which seem 
particularly prone to parallel behavior. Thus the question requires 
careful consideration. 
Recalling a statement cited in Chapter I by A. D. Neale, one 
method of legally proving a conspiracy is to start with the absence of 
price competition and to show that this state of affairs could not be 
maintained without collusion. This involves, of course, the process 
of inferring conduct from structure and performance. But what types 
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of evidence, and how much evidence, are necessary to convince a court 
that the absence of price competition can only be due to conspiracy? 
Professors George C. Thompson and Gerald P. Brady express the problem 
faced by the courts in attempting to determine the presence of concerted 
action with the following statement: 
The task of a government prosecutor would be 
comparatively simple if every case involved a written 
agreement between competitors, recorded in a public 
place. The issue of whether a particular form of 
concerted action is lawful could then be placed 
before the court in a clearcut manner. 
One of the principal problems, however, is to 
prove concerted behavior in the first place. Before 
the court can decide whether the combination is acting 
illegally, it must decide what sort of evidenTe will 
prove that competitors are acting in concert. 
A review of court rulings in cases involving alleged concerted action 
reveals that the courts have not as yet reached such a decision. They 
have not applied a consistent standard in such cases. 
As Professor Carl Kaysen has noted, antitrust proceedings for 
collusive price fixing are central in the history of Sherman Act 
enforcement. But in what Kaysen calls the classic examples of such 
cases, "the finding of collusion rested on ample evidence of elaborate 
machinery for maintaining communication among the members of the 
several conspiracies." Among these classic examples might be listed 
the Addyston Pipe Case, the American Column and Lumber Case, the 
1George C. Thompson and Gerald P. Brady, Antitrust Fundamentals 
(Belmont, California, 1964), p. 57. 
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Trenton Potteries Case, and the Madison Oil Case.2 But Kaysen notes 
that somewhere along the line the courts started to find collusion on 
a different kind of evidence. As he points out, in the second Tobacco 
case and the two basing point cases, the operation of an illegal con-
spiracy was an important part of the offense charged against the 
defendants. 11 Yet proof of the existence of elaborate machinery of 
communication among the defendants was notably absent from the govern-
ment arguments in the trials. Instead there was emphasis on the 
existence of a 'planned common course of action' in the words of the 
Federal Trade Commission, or the existence of 'mutual understanding 
or agreement' in those of the majority of the court. 113 
Apparently no one is quite sure what does constitute sufficient 
evidence for the court to find conspiracy on the basis of market 
structure and performance--not even the courts themselves. As Professor 
Neale has noted, mere uniformity of prices among ostensible competitors 
does not in and of itself prove conspiracy. It is only a starting 
point. 4 The Supreme Court clearly stated as much in 1927 in the 
International Harvester Case. In the words of the Court: 
2carl Kaysen, 11 Collusion under the Sherman Act, 11 Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, No. 65 (1960). The cases listed refer to, respectively, 
Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); 
American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); 
United States v.--rrenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); and United 
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310-U.S. 150 (1940). 
3Ibid. The cases referred to here are American Tobacco Co., et al., 
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Federal Trade Commission v.~~ 
Cement Institute, et~., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); and Triangle Conduit and 
Cable, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 168 Fed. 2d 175 (1948). 
4 Neale, p. 49. 
The fact that competitors may see proper, in the exercise 
of their own judgment to follow the prices of another 
manufacturer, does not establish any su~pression of compe-
tition or show any sinister domination. 
Undoubtedly Kaysen would agree with Neale and the Court in the 
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International Harvester Case in the normative sense. His concern is 
that the courts may have backed away from this 1927 position, and on 
occasion considered Neale 1 s ••starting point" to be also the finish 
line. Consider the second American Tobacco Case. In this case the 
Supreme Court seemingly broadened the ground for finding violation of 
the Sherman Act. In the case the Court ruled that a conspiracy to 
monopolize could be inferred from a pattern of action or behavior over 
time and that a formal agreement to a conspiracy was not necessary. In 
the words of Mr. Justice Burton: 
It is not the form of the combination or the particular 
means used but the result to be achieved that the statute 
condemns. It is not of importance whether the means used to 
accomplish the unlawful objective are in themselves lawful 
or unlawful. Acts done to give effect to the conspiracy may 
be in themselves wholly innocent acts. Yet, if they are part 
of the sum of the acts which are relied upon to effectuate 
the conspiracy which the statute forbids, they come within 
its prohibition. No formal agreement is necessary to consti-
tute an unlawful conspiracy .... Where the circumstances 
are such as to warrant a jury in finding that the conspira-
tors had a unity of purpose or a common design or under-
standing, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement, 
the conclusion that a conspiracy is established is 
justified.6 
What are the implications of this decision? Does the case reverse the 
earlier International Harvester decision? Does it outlaw conscious 
parallelism? Numerous economists and lawyers have addressed themselves 
5united States v. International Harvester, 276 U.S. 693, (1927), 
pp. 708-709. 
6American Tobacco Company v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, (1946). 
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to these questions" In a classic article dealing with this particular 
case, William H. Nicholls argues that the case "brought wholly tacit, 
nonaggressive oligopoly fully within the reach of the conspiracy pro-
visions of the Sherman Act. 11 Nicholls points out, while 
there was plentiful and undisputed evidence that the three 
defendant dominant firms had behaved identically with regard 
to prices, terms of sale, and general business practices, 
.. the case was probably unique in that there was not a 
whit of evidence that a common plan had ever been contem-
plated or proposed. The government's evidence was 
admittedly wholly circumstantial.? 
In the case, each firm was alleged to have acted similarly with the 
knowledge that the others would so act, to their mutual self-interest. 
Again, in Nicholls 1 words, the Court 
accepted the practical implications of the assumption 
... that a few dominant firms will, perhaps independ-
ently and purely as a matter of self-interest, evolve 
nonaggressive patterns of behavior.8 
Since the Court did find conspiracy in this case, the decision might be 
interpreted as outlawing conscious parallelism. For as Nicholls 
approvingly admits, the breadth of this case is so farreaching that, 
11 if it were generally followed, the behavior of few oligopolies could 
probably escape condemnation as 'conspiratorial 1 • 119 
Professor E. V. Rostow of the Yale Law School seems to be in 
complete agreement with Nicholls. As he sees the decision, it means 
that 
parallel action based on acknowledged self-interest 
within a defined market structure is sufficient 
7William H. Nicholls, 11 The Tobacco Case of 1946, 11 American 
Economic Review, XXXIX, p. 285. 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid.' p. 286. 
evidence of illegal action under Section l of the 
Sherman Act,10 
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Professor Almarin Phillips strongly disagrees with Nicholls and Rostow 
in his assessment of the case, He argues that while, when read in 
vacuo, the case might appear to outlaw parallelism per se, such is far 
from true, 11 His contention is that there was such overwhelming 
evidence to the effect that the parallelism could only be a joint 
effort to injure or destroy smaller competitors, that the decision did 
not outlaw oligopoly, In his words, the case stopped "far from con-
deming the informal, tacit organization of oligopoly because of its 
influence on prices and the price structure. n l 2 
Regardless of which view of the American Tobacco decision is 
correct, the courts moved even further in the direction of seeing as 
synonymous parallelism and conspiracy in two subsequent cases. In the 
1948 Cement Institute case, the Court found evidence that each of the 
members of the industry had adhered to a delivered pricing system knowing 
that all others would do the same sufficient to establish conspiracy, 
It is enough to warrant a finding of combination within the 
meaning of the Sherman Act if there is evidence that persons, 
with knowledge that concerted action was contemplated and 
invited, give adherence and then participate in a scheme,13 
A lower court carried this line of reasoning even further in the Rigid 
Steel Conduit case of the same year. In this case, one of the charges 
against the defendants was that they had adhered to a delivered pricing 
lOL V, Ro stow, "The New Sherman Act, an Instrument of Progress, 11 
University of Chicago Law Review, XIV, No. 4, (1947), pp, 567-600, 
11 Phillips, pp. 55-56, 
12 Ibid,, p, 56, 
13Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S, 683, 
p 0 716 0 
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system in the knowledge that the others were doing likewise. No mention 
of any agreement was made. The lower court found the defendants guilty, 
and the Supreme Court, on a four to four vote, allowed the decision to 
stand. 14 
This reasoning was carried still further in the 1950 case, Milgram 
v, Loew 1 s. In this case, eight motion picture distributors were sued 
by a drive-in movie for refusing to supply it with first-run films. A 
district court found the distributors guilty, and held that their common 
refusal to supply such films could not have been the result of indepen-
dent business judgment. This common refusal was held sufficient, in 
and of itself, to establish a violation of the law. Identity of 
behavior was all that was required to establish guilt.15 Such thinking 
led the Federal Trade Commission to conclude: 
When a number of enterprises follow a parallel course of 
action in the knowledge and contemplation of the fact that 
all are acting alike, they have, in effect, formed ... 
an agreement .... The obvious fact [is] that the 
identical prices achieved through conscious parallel 
action is the same as that of similar prices achieved 
through overt collusion and, for this reason, the 
Commission treated the conscious parallelism of actign 
as a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
These happy days for the Federal Trade Commission were abruptly 
ended, however, in the 1954 case, Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. 
14Triangle Conduit and Cable Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 
168 f, 2d. 157, 
15Milgram v. Loew 1 s, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 416. 
16Federal Trade Commission, Notice to the Staff: In Re: 
Commission Policy Toward Geographic Pricing Practices (October 12, 
1948). Cited in Report of the Attorney General 1 s National Committee 
to Study the Antitrust Laws. May 31, 1955, p. 38. 
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Paramount Film Distributing Corporation.17 This case, similar in many 
respects to Milgram v. Loew's, yielded substantially different results. 
In it the Court found that the conduct of the defendants, despite its 
uniformity, could be adequately explained by independent business 
justification, and added: 
But this Court has never held that proof of parallel 
business behavior conclusively establishes agreement or, 
phrased differently, that such behavior itself consti-
tutes a Sherman Act offense. Circumstantial evidence 
of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy 
inroads into the traditional attitude toward conspiracy; 
but 'conscious parallelism• has ?Ht yet read conspiracy 
out of the Sherman Act entirely. 
Thus the Court ruled that while uniform business behavior is evidence 
relevant to proof of agreement, it is not sufficient ipso facto to 
warrant a finding of conspiracy. It is significant that the Attorney 
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws declared 
itself to be in full accord with that Supreme Court reasoning. The 
Committee stated: 
'Conscious parallelism' is not a blanket equivalent of 
conspiracy. Its probative value is establishing the 
ultimate fact of conspiracy will vary case by case. 
Proof of agreement, express or implied, is still indis-
pensable to the establishment of a conspiracy under the 
antitrust laws.19 
Where does that leave the firm which finds itself in court facing 
price-fixing charges today? Some observations on that question are 
offered later in this chapter. 
17Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 
346 U.S. 537 (1954). 
18 . 
Ibid., p. 541. 
19 Report of the Attorney General 1 s National Committee to Study the 
Antitrust Laws, p. 39. 
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What lessons, if any, may be learned from this trek through legal 
history? It seems to indicate that several questions need to be 
answered. First, what does Congress wish to outlaw with the national 
antitrust laws? If the answer is price-fixing, then one is again faced 
with the problem of deciding what type of evidence is required to prove 
a price-fixing charge. The practice of giving a different answer to 
that question almost every time such a case appears in court is hardly 
satisfactory. Should the antitrust laws then simply strike at 
uniformity of action? Or perhaps at all instances of identical bidding 
as Mund seems to favor? But is this uniformity of action (or conscious 
parallelism) the result of collusion or of rational oligopolistic 
conduct? Before that question can be answered, however, the terms 
11 coll usion 11 and 11 rational ol i go pol i stic conduct 11 must be defined, for 
as Richard E. Low points out, these terms themselves have quite diverse 
meanings in economics. 20 
The failure of Congress and the courts to successfully deal with 
these questions underscores the unsatisfactory nature of our present 
conduct-oriented antitrust laws. There may be merit in Law's contention 
that 11 those who favor attacks on parallel business conduct might con-
centrate on curing the disease (if a disease it is) rather than the 
symptoms . .. 21 Kaysen and Turner advanced such an approach 
(perhaps a bit extreme} with their proposed structure-oriented antitrust 
20Richard E. Low, Modern Economic Organization (Homewood, Illinois, 
1970} , p. 377n. 
21 Ibid., p. 379, 
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statutes.22 Whether or not the antitrust laws are revised and 
redirected, Kaysen and Turner's idea of creating a special Economic 
Court merits consideration. The following statement by Neale clearly 
suggests the need for a high degree of expertise in the handling of 
complicated antitrust proceedings. 
To distinguish between informed oligopoly and collusion as 
the cause of damped-down price competition is the most 
difficult task that the courts have to face ... , given 
that they must give due weight to normal legal safeguards 
in favour of accused persons and yet avoid being deceived 
by merely specious arguments. It would not be claimed 
that they never make a mistake in this task. Indeed, the 
distinction is not always hard and fast; one can imagine 
situations in which it would be genuinely difficult even 
for the businessman himself to say whether he was acting 
from individual prudence or under the suasion of a common 
understanding ...• 23 
Given the degree of difficulty involved and the importance of the 
outcome, it would seem that to ask a jury to digest sophisticated 
economic theories during the short course of a trial and to use them 
skillfully to reach a verdict in complicated antitrust proceedings is 
perhaps asking too much. 
Implications for the Litigants 
Having discussed some of the national policy implications of the 
case, attention is now turned to the parties directly involved in the 
case. It would seem that both the State and the defendants could 
benefit from a careful study of the case. There are some rather obvious 
lessons for each. Consider first the State. On the one hand the State 
22car1 Kaysen and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic 
and Legal Analysis (Cambridge, 1965), Ch. 8. 
23 Neale, p. 51. 
136 
sought competitive bids on their liquid asphalt purchases, presumably 
in hopes of obtaining the product at the lowest possible price. But at 
the same time the State adopted policies which would tend to minimize 
its chances of attaining its goal. As has been shown, the State's 
buying procedure practically guaranteed uniform price quotations from 
suppliers as well as a geographically segmented market. It discouraged 
competitors from risking a price war by lowering their bids. And 
finally, to add insult to injury, the State even made sure that if 
there existed a collusive agreement, it could be easily policed by the 
conspirators. The State's practice of notifying all bidders of the 
winning bid and bidder would have discouraged any cheating on an illegal 
agree~ent if one existed. 
The case makes obvious the need for correcting some of the 
weaknesses of the bidding procedure used by the State prior to the 
initiation of the suit. It is clear that in order to obtain the lowest 
possible bid, the State must inform all perspective bidders of certain 
pertinent information. The bidder should know the quantities to be 
purchased and the time and place of delivery. This would help to give 
the supplier an incentive to compete more vigorously. The State might 
also give some consideration to the idea of lagging the time between 
the opening of bids and sending out notification of the contract award 
to unsuccessful bidders. 
The fact that the State made several changes in its bidding 
procedure after October, 1965, would seem to indicate that the State 
learned at least something from its experience. And what of the 
defendants? 
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Whether Oklahoma asphalt suppliers were indeed engaged in an 
i11egal conspiracy or not, it is undeniable that they were less than 
politic in their behavior. While one may point to the imperfections 
of present antitrust laws and judicial proceedings, the fact remains 
that everyone must 11 play by the rules as they are written. 11 If firms 
are going to perform in a manner which might raise questions, they must 
be prepared to answer those questions. And it should have been clear 
to the respondents that the continued submitting of identical bids, 
the continuous price discrimination against the State, and other 
facets of their performance (regardless of how well justified in their 
own eyes) would ultimately raise the ire of the State. 
Oklahoma asphalt suppliers would have done well to have 
familiarized themselves with antitrust law and enforcement practices 
at the time of the formation of the Asphalt Refiners Association. At 
the very least, a knowledge of the implications of Executive Order 10936 
and a reading of the following passages might have given the respondents 
a hint as to their fate. The first quote is taken from Jerrold G. 
Van Cise, formerly chairman of the Section on Antitrust Law of the New 
York State Bar Association and chairman of the Section on Antitrust Law 
of the American Bar Association. He was also a member of the Attorney 
General 1 s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws . 
• . . an unnatural uniformity of action between competitors 
•.• may be viewed by the courts as evidencing an unlawful 
arrangement as clearly as any written agreement. Again, 
the records of a telephone company listing calls between 
private homes of competitors immediately prior to a price 
increase, if unexplained, may be embarrassing. Uniformity 
of action and unusual telephone calls [or motel meetings?] 
do not, of course, prove the existence of a conspiracy, but 
such conduct blazes a trail that may be readily followed 
by the imaginative prosecutor to determine whether or 
not a conspiracy ever existed.24 
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The second quote, taken from A. D. Neale once again, provides a further 
clue of what might be expected in court. 
Many people in industry in the United States would hold 
that the courts are at times too readily persuaded of 
collusion and that they give too little weight to the 
good reasons which prudent and well-informed businessmen 
often have--independent of any agreement--for not up-
setting the going price. It may perhaps be that the 
courts are not always so rigorous in their handling of 
circumstantial evidence in price-fixing cases as they 
would be in matters of major crime. It is a very human 
tendency in law to make the evidence fit the crime no 
less than the punishment; evidence good enough to secure 
a conviction for a minor motoring offense would often be 
found wanting in a murder tria1.z5 
As a final observation, the firm which has any reason to believe 
that its performance might raise even the slightest suspicion of an 
antitrust violation would be well advised to be influenced by two 
factors. First, the firm should remember that while the legal require-
ment for a conviction in a criminal case is proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, a civil case is decided on a preponderance of the evidence. This 
means that the legal requirement for securing a conviction in a case 
such as State of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials Corporation, et!]_., is 
less than in a criminal case. Second, the firm should assume that 
Ritter and Silber 6s previously cited maxim (that there is a conspira-
torial explanation for everything) is accurate and conduct itself 
accordingly. 
24van Cise, p. 33. 
25Neale, p. 51. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this dissertation has been to examine certain legal 
and economic implications of liquid asphalt pricing. Specifically, two 
hypotheses were tested. The high incidence of antitrust litigation 
involving the sale of liquid asphalt led to the formulation of the first 
hypothesis, namely that: Because of some special market conditions 
peculiar to the liquid asphalt industry, firms in that industry are 
particularly susceptible to antitrust involvement. It was further 
hypothesized that: Because of these same market conditions, an asphalt 
supplier may well be found guilty of an antitrust violation when in 
fact the firm's conduct conforms to that which could be expected of an 
independently-acting, profit-maximizing firm. 
The case, State of Oklahoma v. Allied Materials Corporation, et~., 
was used as a model for testing the hypotheses. In order to approach 
the issue it was necessary first to examine the structure of the market. 
It was then found that given the nature of the product, the State 1 s 
bidding procedure, and other structural characteristics of the market, 
an economist would expect to find virtually identical performance 
whether conduct was collusive or noncollusive. 
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Then on the basis of factors determined to have influenced the 
State's decision to initiate proceedings, it was concluded that 
Oklahoma asphalt suppliers were espec.ially susceptible to antitrust 
involvement" The first hypothesis was thus confirmed. Next, upon 
reviewing the legal requirements for conviction in civil proceedings 
and considering the difficulty frequently involved in attempting to 
infer conduct from performance, it was concluded that even though an 
economist might find the performance of liquid asphalt suppliers con-
sistent with noncollusive conduct, the jury might well hand down a 
verdict of guilt" It was noted that the problem of distinguishing 
between informed oligopoly and collusion as a cause of damped-down 
price competition is one of the most difficult tasks the courts have 
to face" The second hypothesis was thus confirmed. 
Finally, attention was turned to the policy implications of the 
case. National policy considerations as well as implications for the 
litigants themselves were discussed. First, the need for the courts to 
decide to what degree parallel action should be regarded as proof of 
illegal collusion without explicit proof of the coordinating mechanism 
was noted" A judicial review of such cases revealed that the courts 
have not satisfactorily dealt with the issue. Consequently, it was 
recommended that serious consideration be given the idea of reviewing 
the present conduct-oriented approach to maintaining competition with 
an eye toward substituting a structure-oriented approach" It was also 
suggested that, given the technical nature of such litigation, considera-
tion should be given the idea of establishing a special Economic Court 
to handle antitrust cases" Last, it was noted that certain features 
of the Statetts bidding procedure could be improved, and some conduct 
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guidelines were suggested for firms in industries having a high degree 
of susceptibility to antitrust involvement. 
As a final note, it must be emphasized that nothing in this paper 
is intended to reflect unfavorably on either the conduct or outcome of 
the case around which the study is centered. The responsibility for 
determining the legality or illegality of the conduct of the defendants 
and co-conspirators in the case falls within the domain of the court and 
in no way enters into this dissertation. The conclusions reached in 
the study are totally independent of the question of the correctness or 
incorrectness of the jury in the present case. 
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